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Why   do   states   invest   the   amount   they   do   in   their   militaries?   I   identify   three   sets   of  
causes.   First,   political   institutions   that   create   public   accountability   shape   how   states  
respond   to   the   likelihood   of   conflict.   Publically   accountable   leaders   shift   how  much  
they   spend   as   the   likelihood   of   conflict   shifts.   This   relationship   between   democratic  
institutions  and  threat  response  explains  both  why  democracies  spend  less  on  average  
than  non-­‐‑democracies,  and  why  some  democracies,  some  of  the  time,  invest  heavily  in  
their  military.   It   also   helps   explain  why  democracies  win  wars  more   often   than   non-­‐‑
democracies,  even  when  targeted:  democracies  invest  in  their  military  in  order  to  build  
military   capacity.   Autocracies   invest   in   their   military   for   other   reasons.   Specifically,  
they  use  military  spending  as  a  side  payment  to  high-­‐‑ranking  members  of  the  military.  
In   autocracies,   military   spending   is   the   cost   of   military   support.   This   leads   to   the  
counterintuitive   finding  that  when  the  military  runs   the  government,   the  state   invests  
less  in  the  military.  Finally,  I  examine  the  foreign  origins  of  military  spending,  and  find  
that   state   military   spending   is   affected   by   military   spending   in   other   states   through  
several   pathways.   State   military   spending   is   positively   interdependent   with   military  
spending  in  states  with  which  it   is   likely  to  fight.   It   is  negatively   interdependent  with  
xi	  	  
states  with  which   it   is   allied.  However,   it   is   positively   associated  with   the   aggregate  
likelihood   of   conflict   of   its   allies,   making   alliances   a   source   of   both   less   and   more  
military   spending.   In   contrast   to   the   conventional  wisdom,   I   do   not   find   evidence   of  
military  spending  in  response  to  rival  spending  when  the  likelihood  of  conflict  and  ally  
spending   are   accounted   for.   The   three   papers   in   this   dissertation   contribute   to   the  
literatures   on   military   spending   and   arms   races,   alliances,   enduring   rivalries,   and  
political  institutions  and  foreign  policy.  
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Chapter  1:  Introduction  
The   question   of   who   arms,   to   what   extent,   and   why,   is   central   to   the   study   of  
politics.   Arming   is   the   acquisition   of   the   tools   of   violence.   The   ability   to   commit  
violence  is  proportional  to  the  possession  of  the  tools  of  violence,  and  some  actors  have  
more   than   others.   The   ability   to   commit   violence   shapes   how   actors   relate   to   one  
another.  Actors  who  can  commit  violence  can  exploit  those  who  do  not.  Understanding  
who  can  use  violence,  and  when  and  how  they  use  it,  is  necessary  to  understand  a  wide  
range  of  political   activities,   especially   in   the   international   sphere.  Those  who   lack   the  
tools  of  violence  can  acquire  them,  but  doing  so  is  costly.  Why  do  some  actors  pay  those  
costs,  while  others  do  not?    
I  address  the  question  of  who  arms,  and  how  much,  by  looking  at  variation  in  the  
military  spending  of  states.  Military  spending  is  only  one  type  of  arming,  much  as  states  
are  only  one   type  of  political   actor.  But   just   as   states   are   the  most   important  political  
actor   in   the   international   system,  military   spending   is   the  most   important   instance  of  
arming.  Militaries  make  up  the  bulk  of  the  violent  capacity  of  many,  if  not  most,  states.  
Despite   that,   there   is   enormous   variation   in   the   degree   to   which   states   invest   their  
resources  in  their  military.  I  provide  a  series  of  partial  explanations  for  that    
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variation.  Those  explanations  partially  answer  the  broader  question  of  who  arms,  and  
how  much,  for  at  least  the  subset  of  political  actors  known  as  states.      
What   explains   variation   in   military   spending?   Two   broad   answers   exist   in   the  
literature   on   international   relations.   The   first   is   foreign   threat.   Governments   increase  
their  military   spending  when   they   are   threatened,   and  decrease   it  when   they   are   not  
(Nordhaus  et.  al.  2012).  The  second  is  political  institutions.  Democratic  states  invest  less  
in   their   military   than   non-­‐‑democratic   states   (controlling   for   threat)   (Fordham   and  
Walker  2005,  Goldsmith  2003,  Goldsmith  2007).   I  explore   these   two  causes  of  military  
spending   in   three  papers,  and   find   that   their   importance  varies  across  different   states  
and  circumstances.  I  find  that  democratic  states  are  more  responsive  to  a  particular  kind  
of   foreign   threat:   the   likelihood  of   conflict.  Variation   in  autocratic   states,  on   the  other  
hand,   is   driven   by   domestic   conditions,   particularly   the   role   of   the   military   in  
government.   In   different   types   of   state,   variation   in   military   spending   is   driven   by  
different  factors.  
Each  paper  examines  how  political   institutions  shape  military  spending.  Political  
institutions   create   and   describe   the   relationships   between   political   actors.   The   term  
institution   captures   a   wide   range   of   power   relationships,   with   varying   levels   of  
formality,  precision,  and  scope.  Each  paper  explores  a  different  set  of  institutions.  Paper  
1  focuses  on  democratic  institutions,  specifically  those  that  create  public  accountability.  
Paper  2  examines  the  role  of  the  military  capture  of  the  government.  Paper  3  examines  
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the   role   of  military   alliances,  which   provide   an   alternative   to  military.   Together   they  
look   at   political   institutions   at   three   different   levels   –   broad   regime   distinctions  
(democracy/autocracy),   within   category   variation   (military/civilian   autocracy),   and  
international  institutions  (alliances).    
Paper  1  makes  several  contributions.  First,  it  shows  that  the  effect  of  the  likelihood  
of   conflict   is   conditional   on   the   institutions   of   the   state.   Democracies   invest   in   their  
military   in  order   to  build  war   fighting   capacity,   leading  democratic   states   to   respond  
more  to  changes  in  the  likelihood  of  war  than  non-­‐‑democratic  states.  This  amends  the  
existing  literature,  which  assumes  that  states  respond  equally  to  similar  threats  to  their  
security   (Waltz   1979,   Nordhaus   et.   al.   2012,   Fordham   and   Walker   2005,   Goldsmith  
2003).   It   also   provides   a   partial   explanation   for   democratic   success   in   wartime,  
especially  when  they  are  the  targeted  state.  Democratic  spending  increases  the  capacity  
of  the  state  more  than  autocratic  spending.  Paper  1  also  shows  that  the  existing  work,  
which  claims   that  democratic  states   invest   less   in   their  militaries   than  non-­‐‑democratic  
states,   all   else   equal,   only   holds   when   conflict   is   unlikely.   When   conflict   is   likely,  
democracies   spend   as  much   or  more   than   non-­‐‑democracies   in   similar   situations.   The  
current  story,  that  democratic  states  are  more  peaceful,  is  incorrect.  Democracies  spend  
less  on  average  because  they  are  more  efficient  in  their  military  spending,  not  because  
they   are   inherently  more   pacific.   Finally,   paper   1   shows   that   the   specific   democratic  
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institutions   that   matter   are   those   that   make   leaders   accountable   to   the   public,   mass  
suffrage  and  political  competition.  
Paper   1   shows   that   autocracies   respond   less   than  democracies   to   changes   in   the  
likelihood  of  war.  Paper  2  demonstrates  that  autocracies  use  military  spending  as  a  side  
payment   to   high-­‐‑ranking   members   of   the   military.   In   civilian   autocracies,   military  
spending   is   the   cost   of  military   support.   In  military   autocracies,  where  military   elites  
can   extract   rents   directly,   military   spending   is   less   necessary.   This   leads   to   the  
counterintuitive   finding  that  when  the  military  runs   the  government,   the  state   invests  
less   in   the  military.   This   finding   contradicts   existing  work,  which   finds   that  military  
involvement   in   government   increases   military   spending   (Jackman   1976,   Nordlinger  
1970)  or  has  no  effect  (Conrad  et.  al.  2013).    
Paper  3  examines  the  foreign  origins  of  military  spending.  I  find  that  state  military  
spending   is   affected   by   military   spending   in   other   states   through   several   pathways.  
State  military   spending   is   positively   interdependent  with  military   spending   in   states  
with  which   it   is   likely   to   fight,   which   is   consonant  with   existing  work   and   paper   1.  
Military  spending  is  negatively  interdependent  with  ally  military  spending.  However,  it  
is   positively   associated  with   the   aggregate   likelihood   of   conflict   of   its   allies,   making  
alliances   a   source   of   both   more   and   less   military   spending.   Both   findings   support  
theories  of  alliances  that  suggest  substitution  effects  between  allies  (e.g.  Morrow  1993).  
Allied   states   exchange   arming   for   allying,   but   acquire   some  of   their   ally’s   threat   as   a  
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result.  The  finding  of  negative  interdependence  between  allies  supports  those  theories  
that  warn  of  the  risk  of  free-­‐‑riding  in  alliances.  In  contrast  to  the  conventional  wisdom,  I  
do   not   find   evidence   of   military   spending   in   response   to   rival   spending   when   the  
likelihood   of   conflict   and   ally   spending   are   accounted   for.   This   finding   calls   into  
question   the   importance   of   enduring   rivalries,   separate   from   their   use   as   a   proxy   for  
likelihood  of  conflict.    
Each  paper  of  this  dissertation  can  be  read  as  an  independent  article  or  as  part  of  a  
broader  project  on  political   institutions  and  military   spending.  Taken  separately,   they  
improve   on   the   existing   knowledge   in   numerous   ways,   including   those   described  
above.   Taken   together,   they   show   that   the   effects   of   political   institutions   go   beyond  
independent,   linear   effects   on   phenomena   of   interest.  Military   spending   provides   an  
excellent  window  into  the  various  ways  that  political   institutions  matter,  because  it   is,  
itself,  multi-­‐‑use  and  multi-­‐‑dimensional.  Political  institutions  shape  how  states  respond  
to  other  important  variables,  such  as  foreign  threat.  They  shape  who  gets  paid,  and  in  
what   manner.   They   provide   possible   solutions   to   problems,   and   help   create   the  
environment  in  which  the  state  exists.    
     
6  	  	  
Works  Cited  	  
Conrad,   Justin,   Hong-­‐‑Cheol   Kim,   and   Mark   Souva.   2013.   “Narrow   Interests   and  
Military  Resource  Allocation   in  Autocratic  Regimes.”   Journal  of  Peace  Research   50:  
737-­‐‑750.  
Fordham,   Benjamin   O.   and   Thomas   C.   Walker.   2005.   “Kantian   Liberalism,   Regime  
Type,   and   Military   Resource   Allocation:   Do   Democracies   Spend   Less?”  
International  Studies  Quarterly  49  (1):  141–57.  
Goldsmith,  Benjamin  E.  2007.  “Defense  Effort  and  Institutional  Theories  of  Democratic  
Peace  and  Victory:  Why  Try  Harder?”  Security  Studies  16:  189–222.  
Goldsmith,   Benjamin   E.   2003.   “Bearing   the   Defense   Burden,   1886–1989:   Why   Spend  
More?”  Journal  of  Conflict  Resolution  47  (5):  551–73.  
Jackman,  Richard.  1976.  “Politicians  in  Uniform:  Changes  in  the  Third  World.”  American  
Political  Science  Review  70  (4):  1078–1097.  
Morrow,   James  D.   1993.   “Arms  Versus  Allies:   Trade-­‐‑offs   in   the   Search   for   Security.”  
International  Organization  47  (2):  207-­‐‑33.  
Nordhaus,   William,   John   R.   Oneal,   and   Bruce   Russett.   2012.   “The   Effects   of   the  
International   Security   Environment   on   National   Military   Expenditures:   A  
Multicountry  Study.”  International  Organization  66:  491-­‐‑513.  
Nordlinger,   Eric   A.   1970.   “Soldiers   in   Mufti:   The   Impact   of   Military   Rule   Upon  
Economic  and  Social  Change  in  the  Non-­‐‑Western  States.”  American  Political  Science  
Review  64  (4):  1131–1148.  
Rider,   Toby   J.,  Michael   G.   Findley,   and   Paul   F.   Diehl.   2011.   “Just   Part   of   the   Game?  
Arms  Races,  Rivalry,  and  War.”  Journal  of  Peace  Research  47  (6):  85-­‐‑100.  
Waltz,  Kenneth  N.  1979.  Theory  of  International  Politics.  Reading,  MA:  Addison-­‐‑Wesley.  
     
7  	  	  
Chapter  2:  Military  Spending,  Democracy,  and  the  
Likelihood  of  Conflict  (Paper  1)  
  
Abstract  
Different   types  of   states   respond  differently   to   their   circumstances.  Democratic   states,  
with  leaders  who  are  accountable  to  a  broad  public  through  institutions  of  competitive  
elections   and   mass   suffrage,   invest   in   their   militaries   in   response   to   changes   in   the  
likelihood   of   conflict.   Autocratic   states   respond   less,   or   not   at   all,   to   shifts   in   the  
probability  of  conflict,  suggesting  that  the  purpose  of  military  spending  differs  in  states  
with   and   without   public   accountability.   Because   democratic   military   spending   is  
directed   towards  deterring  and  winning  wars,  while  autocratic   spending   serves  other  
purposes,  democratic  targets  become  less  likely  to  lose  wars  as  they  spend  more.  
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How   do   political   institutions   shape   arming   decisions?   Military   spending   is  
commonly  understood  as  a  response  to  foreign  threats.  Evidence  suggests  that  belief  is  
broadly   correct   (Goldsmith   2007,  Nordhaus   et.   al.   2012,  Dunne   et.   al.).   Existing  work  
also   demonstrates   that   different   kinds   of   states   spend   different   amounts   on   their  
military.  Specifically,  they  find  that  more  democratic  states  spend  less  on  their  military  
(Fordham   and   Walker   2005).   Both   findings,   while   broadly   true,   mask   an   important  
source  of  variation:  different  types  of  states  respond  differently  to  their  circumstances.  
Little  or  no  attention   is  given   to  how  diverse   states  perceive  and  respond   to   identical  
threats  differently.    
Many   leaders   answer   to   a   domestic   audience.   The   leader   can   be   replaced   if   she  
chooses  too  many  unsuccessful  policies,  or  deviates  too  far  from  the  preferred  policies  
of   the   domestic   audience.   Public   accountability,   created   by   institutions   that   allow   a  
large   domestic   audience   to   replace   a   leader,   motivates   leaders   to   try   harder   during  
conflicts,  because  losing  can  cost  them  their  job  (Bueno  de  Mesquita  et.  al.  2003,  Croco  
2011).   Conflict   can   be   politically   costly   for   leaders   even   if   the   outcome   is   favorable,  
particularly   in   longer   conflicts   (Gardner   and   Segura   1998,   Bennett   and   Stam   1998,  
Valentino  et.  al.  2010).  Leaders  subject  to  public  oversight,  then,  should  seek  to  do  two  
things  –  prepare  to  win  conflicts  they  think  are  likely,  and  try  to  deter  challenges  that  
could  lead  to  politically  costly  conflicts.  One  way  of  doing  both  is  to  invest  in  military  
power,   which   can   deter   challenges   and   promote   a   more   favorable   outcome   should  
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conflict   occur.   Both   goals   result   in   more   military   spending   in   response   to   perceived  
increases   in   the   likelihood  of  war.   I   argue   that  public   accountability,   created  by  mass  
suffrage  and  political  competition,  motivates  democratic   leaders   to  respond  to   foreign  
threats  in  proportion  to  their  likelihood  of  manifesting  in  a  manner  visible  to  the  public.  
Foreign   threats   are   most   visible   when   they   are   militarized   and   fatal.   I   find   that  
democracies  spend  less  on  their  military  when  conflict  is  unlikely,  but  respond  more  to  
increases   in  the  likelihood  of  conflict.  However,   they  do  not  respond  more  to  shifts   in  
the  capabilities  of  the  strategic  rivals  or  the  aggregate  military  spending  of  states  with  
whom   they   do   not   share   strategic   interests.   My   argument   implies   that   democratic  
military   spending   is   more   geared   toward   success   in   foreign   wars   than   autocratic  
military   spending.   My   findings   also   support   that   claim,   as   democratic   targets   are  
disproportionately  less  likely  to  lose  when  their  military  spending  is  higher.    
  
Review  of  the  Literature  
Military   spending   is   a   response   to   foreign   threats.   That   contention   exists   in   the  
classic   theoretical   literature   (Waltz   1979,  Walt   1990),   is   the   basis   for   the   considerable  
body  of  work  on  arms  races  (Richardson  1960,  Glaser  2000,  Morrow  1993),  and  has  been  
subject  to  recent  empirical  evaluation  (Nordhaus  et.  al.  2012,  Goldsmith  2003,  Dunne  et.  
al.   2007,   Rosh   1988).   The  military   provides   security   by   increasing   the   capacity   of   the  
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state  to  use  violence  to  inflict  costs,  and  preventing  costs  from  violence,  either  through  
deterrence   or   direct   prevention.  What   is   considered   a   threat   varies  widely   across   the  
literature.  Answers  include:    
• any  state  capable  of  inflicting  damage  (Waltz  1979)    
• any  state  capable  and  with  intent  (Walt  1990)  
• strategic  rivals  (Colaresi  et.  al.  2008)  
• beliefs  about  the  likelihood  of  war  in  the  future  (Bueno  de  Mesquita  1981,  
Nordhaus  et.  al.  2012)  
The   common   understanding   of   threat,   across   most   of   the   conceptualizations   listed  
above,   is   that  an  actor  who   is  a   threat  possesses   the  ability  and   intention   to  harm  the  
interests   of   the   state.   These   different   understandings   of   threat   vary   across   other  
dimensions,   however.   Some   are   directly   tied   to   conflict   (Bueno   de   Mesquita   1981,  
Nordhaus   et.   al.   2012),   while   others   focus   more   on   both   hot   and   cold   strategic  
competition   (Colaresi   et.   al.   2008).   Waltz,   and   other   classic   big   thinkers   in   the   field,  
focused   primarily   on   the   causes   and   effects   of   power.   An   important   amendment   to  
Waltz’s   argument   came   from  Walt,   who   argued   that   states   do   not   balance   (through  
alliances)   against   just   power.   They   do   it   against   power   that   is   perceived   as   having  
hostile   intent   (Walt   1990).  Rosh   introduced   the   idea  of   a   security  web  on  which   state  
military  spending  –  and  foreign  policies  more  generally  –  might  depend.  The  security  
web,   or   security   environment,   is   a   familiar   concept   in   international   relations,   which  
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spans  multiple  levels  of  analysis,  including  both  the  systemic  and  dyadic  levels.  When  
defining  the  foreign  security  environment,  I  focus  on  the  concept  of  threat,  with  an  eye  
to   these   to   central   formulations.   Threat   is   some   combination   of   the   capacity   to   harm,  
and  the  desire,  willingness,  and  likelihood  of  doing  so.  The  relative  importance  of  each,  
however  –  the  emphasis  of  capacity  versus  intent  –  may  vary  across  state  types.    
  
Institutions  and  Arming  
Democratic   institutions   affect   a   variety   of   international   phenomena   and   foreign  
policies,   including   conflict   occurrence,   behavior,   and   outcomes.  Work   on   that   subject  
intersects  with  the  arming  literature  when  it  dwells  on  how  political  institutions  affect  
military   spending,   in   and   out   of  wartime.  One   consistent   finding   is   that   democracies  
spend   less   on   their   military   (Goldsmith   2003).   In   many   empirical   evaluations,   that  
manifests  as  increases  to  polity  or  a  related  measure  being  associated  with  decreases  to  
a  measure  of   aggregate   spending   (absolute  or   relative   to  GDP).  Fordham  and  Walker  
(2005)  directly   investigate   the  pacifying  effect  of  democracy,  and   find,   in  concordance  
with   Kantian   liberal   theory,   democracy   leads   to   less   military   spending.   In   their  
investigation  of  external  security  environment  and  military  spending,  Nordhaus,  Oneal,  
and   Russett   (2012)   find   that   external   threat   does   increase   military   spending.   In   the  
process,  they  also  find  that,  consistent  with  Fordham  and  Walker,  democracy  decreases  
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military   spending.   Further,   they   find   that   democracy   has   the   secondary   effect   of  
reducing  threat  by  making  conflict   less   likely  with  some  states,  which   in  turn  reduces  
military  spending.  
Bueno  de  Mesquita  et.  al.’s  (2003)  selectorate  theory  emphasizes  the  importance  of  
the  size  of  the  winning  coalition,  and  the  body  of  actors  who  could  help  form  a  winning  
coalition  (the  selectorate).  Leaders  with  large  winning  coalitions  have  two  incentives  to  
provide  national   security.   First,   national   security   is   a  public   good   (Dunne   et   al.   2007,  
Smith  1995,  Sandler  and  Hartley  1995)  –  it  is  not  exclusive  or  rival  among  the  domestic  
population.  Large  winning  coalition  leaders  provide  more  public  goods  because,  with  a  
large  coalition,  providing  private  goods  to  buy  support  is  inefficient.  As  a  result,  large  
winning   coalition   leaders   should   be   more   likely   to   provide   national   security.  
Importantly,  those  same  governments  are  likely  to  provide  more  of  other  public  goods  
as  well,  and  there  may  be  substitution  effects.  In  times  of  low  threat,  national  security  is  
already   provided,   and   investments   in   defense   have   small   returns.   Large   winning  
coalition  leaders  invest  in  national  security  when  the  country  is  otherwise  insecure,  and  
invest   in   other   public   goods  when   it   is   relatively   secure,   because   they   are   subject   to  
public  accountability.    
Scholars  like  Lake  and  others  argue  that  democracies  should  try  harder  during  war  
(Lake   1992,  Bueno  de  Mesquita   et.   al.   2003)   for   a   variety   of   reasons.  However,  Reiter  
and  Stam  (2002)  find  no  evidence  that  democracies  are  better  at  extracting  resources  for  
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war.   Goldsmith   (2007)   finds   evidence   that   democracies   do   try   harder.   There   are   a  
variety   of   explanations   for   the   observed   correspondence   between   lower   military  
spending   and   democracy,   and   more   spending   by   democracies   during   wartime.   For  
example,  Goldsmith   tries   to  arbitrate  between   these   three:   executive  constraints,   large  
winning  coalitions  or  political  participation,   and  political   competition.  He  argues   that  
political   competition   is   the   primary   reason   that   democracies   spend   less   during  
peacetime  but  more  during  times  of  war.  In  particular,  competition  leads  to  flexibility  in  
defense  effort.  His  principle  foil  is  the  selectorate  theory,  which  argues  that  as  the  group  
which  is  required  to  maintain  the  winning  coalition  necessary  to  stay  in  power  increases  
in  size,  so  does  the  incentive  of  the  leader  to  provide  public  goods,  rather  than  private  
goods   (Bueno   de   Mesquita   et.   al.   2003).   Goldsmith   agrees   with   the   finding,   but  
disagrees  with  the  mechanism  (2007).  
These,   and   related  works,   address   how  democracies   respond   to  war   rather   than  
more  general  responses  to  threat  –  arms  races  and  similar  dynamics  are  outside  of  the  
scope   of   their   work.   A   substantial   body   of   work   on   war   treats   war   as   a   bargaining  
process,  with  actual  military  action  being  part  of  a  more  general  process,  rather  than  a  
wholly   distinct   enterprise   (Wagner   2000,   Blainey   1976).  Arming   is   also   a   part   of   that  
process  –  the  provision  of  security  through  policy,  or  the  acquisition  of  goods  through  
bargaining  with  other  states.  This  is  consistent  with  formal  models  that  include  arming  
or  arms  races  as  part  of  a  game,  in  which  one  possible  outcome  is  war  (Powell  1999).    
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Theory  
The   literature   on   military   spending   and   political   institutions   neglects   the  
interaction   of   threat   and   institutions.   Democracy   is   a   cluster   of   political   institutions  
associated  with  political   competition,  widespread   suffrage,   the  protection   of  minority  
rights,  and  rule  of  law.  I  examine  the  role  of  public  accountability  on  arming.  Arming  is  
a   policy   choice   made   by   the   leader(s)   of   the   central   government.   One   challenge   to  
modeling   aggregate  military   spending   effectively   is   that   money   can   be   spent   on   the  
military  for  many  reasons,  but  looks  the  same  when  aggregated.  Military  spending  can  
serve  many  purposes:   security   from   foreign   threats,   domestic   security   for   the   regime  
and/or   leader,   side  payments   to   the  military,  and  non-­‐‑security   related  benefits   for   the  
public   (distributive  politics).  For  ease  of  discussion,   I   treat   these  as   if   they  are  wholly  
separate  categories,  but  in  fact  each  dollar  spent  may  serve  multiple  purposes  to  some  
extent.    
National   security,   as   a   non-­‐‑excludable,   non-­‐‑rival   commodity   is   a   public   good.  
While   domestic   actors,   be   they   voters,   leaders,   or   political   elites  may   place   different  
values  on  national  security,  they  cannot  easily  be  excluded  from  it.  Domestic  or  regime  
security,   on   the   other   hand,   favors   some   members   of   society   more   than   others.   In  
particular,  it  favors  those  that  benefit  from  the  status  quo.  Most  of  all,  it  favors  members  
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of  the  regime.  It  is  therefore  more  like  a  club  good.  Side  payments  to  the  military  may  
increase   security,   but   their   primary   purpose   is   to   enrich   (please)   military   elites.  
Distributions   to  members   of   society   outside   of   the   regime   vary   from   focused   private  
goods   (private   contracts,   for   example)   to  widespread   public   and   club   goods,   such   as  
disaster  relief  or   jobs  programs.   In   this  article   I   focus  primarily  on   the   implications  of  
military  spending  as  a  public  good,  but  each  purpose  warrants  further  exploration.    
The  value  of  military  spending  as  a  public  good  is  commensurate  to  the  security  it  
provides,   and   the   necessity   of   security   provision.   The   perception   of   threat,   then,   is   a  
central  motivation  for  investing  in  the  military.  As  perceived  threat  increases,  the  need  
to  spend   in   response   increases.  One   implication   is   that   the  more  a   state  values  public  
goods,  the  more  it  responds  to  changes  in  perceived  threat.  The  state  cares  about  public  
goods,  security  is  a  public  good,  and  military  spending  is  partially  a  way  of  providing  
security.   Military   spending   increases   when   the   public’s   security,   absent   military  
spending,   goes   down.   States   with   political   institutions   that   incentivize   leaders   to  
provide  public  goods  will  respond  more  to  external  threat.    
The  above  argument  suggests  greater  responsiveness  to  threat  in  democracies.  As  
such,   I   expect   them   to   respond   more   to   threats   to   their   security   than   other   states.  
Democracy   has   already   been   widely   shown   to   lower   military   spending   on   average.  
There   are  many   possible   explanations   for   this.   I   expect   democracies   to   spend   less   in  
times  of  low  threat  for  two  reasons.  They  spend  less  on  their  military  when  threat  is  low  
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because   security   is   already   relatively   high,   making   marginal   improvements   through  
arming   less   valuable   relative   to   other   public   goods.  However,  when   threat   increases,  
they   shift   more   resources   into   the   provision   of   security.      As   such,   both   the   effect   of  
democracy   and   the   effect   of   threat   are   conditional.   First,   democracies   spend   less   in  
times  of  low  threat,  but  respond  more  to  increases  in  threat,  negating  or  reversing  the  
effect   in   times   of   high   threat.   Second,   in   consolidated   democracies,   the   ability   of   the  
regime  to  use  repression  to  remain  in  power  is  both  restricted  by  court  systems  and  civil  
liberties,  and  less  necessary,  because  the  leader  has  the  consent  of  the  public.  Unlike  in  
autocratic  states,  military  spending  does  not  provide  domestic  security  for  the  regime.  
Variation   in  military   spending   in   democracies   is   a   product   of   their   external   security  
environment.  
Who  makes  policy  varies  somewhat   from  state   to  state,  but   typically   the  head  of  
state   is   the   principal   decision-­‐‑maker,   sometimes   acting   with   or   on   behalf   of   a  
legislature.   Leaders  make   their   decisions   according   to   their   own  preferences,   and   the  
circumstances   in   which   they   find   themselves   and   their   country   in.   Because   one  
preference  of  leaders  is  to  remain  in  power,  they  also  consider  the  preferences  of  those  
who  could  remove  them  from  power  –  their  constituents.  Political  institutions  intervene  
in  that  process  in  multiple  ways.  They  determine  how  leaders  are  selected  and  remain  
in  power.  They  determine  what  constraints  are  on  the  leader’s  ability  to  make  policy,  as  
well  as  how  and   to  what  degree   they  are  held  accountable   for   the  success  of  policies.  
17  	  	  
Every   leader   answers   to   both   elites   and   the   public,   but   the   degree   to  which   they   do  
varies.  I  assume  that  leaders  desire  to  remain  in  office.  The  larger  the  number  of  people  
required   to   acquire   and   stay   in   office,   the   more   efficient   public   goods   will   become  
relative  to  private  goods  for  earning  support.  Leaders  who  answer  to  large  groups  –  the  
public  –  will  distribute  more  public  goods,  and  favor  policies  whose  benefits  are  widely  
dispersed  (Bueno  de  Mesquita  et  al.  2003).  
I  assume  that  the  public  wishes  to  be  both  secure  from  foreign  threats  and  wealthy,  
but   there   is   a   trade-­‐‑off   between   them.   Their   preferred   policy   (in   this   case,   aggregate  
military   spending)   will   alter   with   their   perception   of   the   inherent   insecurity   of   their  
circumstances.  If  they  are  secure  already,  spending  on  the  military  will  be  inefficient.  It  
would  not  make  sense  for  an  official   to  provide  a  public  good  –  military  spending,   in  
this  case  –  for  which  there  is  little  demand.  Their  incentive  to  provide  it  is  contingent  on  
the   circumstances   of   the   state   –   whether   it   is   under   threat   or   not.   Rather   than   just  
exerting   upward   force   on  military   spending   (as   a   public   good),   public   accountability  
shapes   how   the   government   responds   to   its   security   situation,  which   can   increase   or  
diminish  demand  for   that  particular  public  good.  Such  an  argument   is  at   the  heart  of  
the  literature  on  democracies  and  war  –  even  under  identical  circumstances,  states  with  
different  regimes  respond  differently.  I  argue  that  this  dynamic  is  at  work  even  in  times  
of  peace  –  democracies   that  perceive  conflict  as   likely  ex  ante   increase  spending  more  
than  non-­‐‑democracies.  If  they  are  not  secure,  they  will  spend  on  their  military  until  the  
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optimal  balance  of  security  and  wealth  is  achieved.  While  there  may  be  an  independent  
effect   of   institutions   (general   pacification,   for   example),   they   also   shape   how  
governments  respond  to  their  environment.    
Widespread   suffrage   and   political   competition   create   public   accountability.   The  
general  public  can  replace  the  leader.  This  shifts  the  preferences  of  the  leader  towards  
policies   that   visibly   provide   public   goods.   The   credible   threat   of   replacement  
incentivizes   the   leader   to   perform   better   in   office   across   several   dimensions.   First,   it  
means  that  she  will  enact  policies  that  will  please  the  people  whose  support  is  required  
to   stay   in   power.   Otherwise,   a   leader   with   a   policy   platform   preferred   by   more  
members  of  the  relevant  selectorate  will  replace  her.  Second,  it  requires  leaders  to  enact  
those  policies  as  efficiently  and  competently  as  possible.  Otherwise,  a  more  competent  
leader  with   a   similar   policy   platform  would   replace   him   or   her.   Finally,   leaders  will  
favor   policies   that   they   can   easily   claim   credit   for,   and   avoid   those   that   are   either  
invisible   to   their   relevant   audience,   or   will   expose   them   to   electoral   risk   without  
equivalent  gain.    
This  last  aspect  is  crucial  –  credit  claiming  is  difficult  for  unobserved  public  goods.  
Security   from   foreign   threats   is   a   public   good,   but   is   difficult   to   gauge.   Leaders   of  
democratic   states   should   invest   in   security  when   they   think   the   security  provided  by  
their  investment  is   likely  to  be  observed  and  rewarded,  or,   importantly,  the  insecurity  
created  by  their   lack  of   investment   is   likely  to  be  observed  and  punished.  As  a  result,  
19  	  	  
democratic  leaders  respond  more  to  threats  to  the  security  of  their  state,  but  only  when  
those  threats  are  likely  to  manifest  in  a  manner  visible  to  the  public.  This  can  lead  to  the  
overprovision   of   visible   security   policies,   at   the   expense   of   more   effective   but   less  
visible  alternatives  (Bueno  de  Mesquita  2005).      
The  most  visible  manifestation  of  insecurity  is  open  conflict.  While  the  public  may  
not  be  aware  of  subtle  shifts  in  the  geopolitical  circumstances  of  the  state,  it  will  notice  if  
war   breaks   out.   Politicians   subject   to   political   accountability,   then,   are   particularly  
sensitive  to  changes  in  the  likelihood  of  conflict.  Democratic  leaders  will  invest  more  in  
preparation  for  conflict  when  the  likelihood  of  conflict  goes  up.  Democratic  leaders  may  
also   be   responsive   to   other   kinds   of   threats,   but   no   strategic   competition   has   as  
significant   and   well-­‐‑documented   political   costs   as   those   associated   with   military  
conflict.  Nor,  generally,   are  other   types  of   threats   as  visible   to   the  public.  Arms   races  
may  receive  some  political  attention,  but  nothing  receives  the  same  attention  as,  and  as  
a   result,   threatens   political   elites   like,   fatal   militarized   disputes.   The   likelihood   of  
conflict   instigates   military   spending   on   the   part   of   leaders   subject   to   public  
accountability  because  when  conflict  breaks  out,  the  public  knows  it.    
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Research  Design  
Evaluating   the   relationship   between   regime   type   and   threat   response   requires  
variation   in   spending   and   threat   across   countries   with   different   regime   types,   and  
variation  in  spending  and  threat  within  countries,  over  time.  Dunne  and  Smith  have  an  
excellent   review  of   the   specification   challenges  posed  by  arms   race  dynamics   (Dunne  
and  Smith  2007).  While  not,  by  any  means,  alleviating  all  of  the  various  difficulties,  time  
series   cross   sectional   (TSCS)  data   is  used   in  most   recent   empirical  work  on  aggregate  
military  spending  (Collier  and  Hoeffler  2007,  Fordham  and  Walker  2005,  Nordhaus  et  al  
2012).   I   follow  those  scholars,  and  use  country  year  data   from  1950-­‐‑2000  to  estimate  a  
series  of  multivariate  regression  models  evaluating  my  hypotheses.  I  provide  estimates  
from   a   variety   of   alternative   specifications   to   demonstrate   the   robustness   of   my  
findings.     Following  that,  I  evaluate  potential  alternative  explanations  for  democracy’s  
effect   on   responsiveness   to   threat,   including   elite   accountability   and   a   more   general  
public   goods   story,   using   data   on   autocratic   regime   characteristics   and   alternative  
measures  of  international  threat  environment.  Finally,  I  test  whether  military  spending  
in   democracies   has   a   larger   effect   on   war   outcomes   than   military   spending   in   non-­‐‑
democracies,  using  data  on  war-­‐‑dyad-­‐‑years,  outcomes,  and  military  spending.    
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Measurement  and  Variable  Selection  
Military  Spending  
I   use   TSCS   data   of   logged  military   expenditures   from   1950-­‐‑2000.  While  military  
spending  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  is  easy  to  understand,  and  reflects  how  much  of  itself  
the  state  dedicates  to  military  power  (Fordham  and  Walker  2005),  absolute  changes  in  
spending  are  important  when  considering  the  influence  of  international  threats  –  1%  of  
GDP   is   not   the   same   everywhere.   Each   dollar   spent   is   also   not   equal.   A   reasonable  
assumption  is  that  there  are  diminishing  marginal  returns  per  dollar,  so  larger  numbers  
of  dollars  are   required   to   improve  security  as   total   spending   increases.   I   approximate  
that  dynamic  by  using  the  natural  log  of  military  spending.  Nordhaus  et.  al.  also  use  the  
natural   log   of   military   spending   in   their   investigation   of   the   relationship   between  
external   threat   and   military   spending   (2012).   I   use   their   data,   which   they   construct  
using  data  from  the  Correlates  of  War  project  and  SIPRI1.  
  
Likelihood  of  Conflict  
I  use  a  variable  created  by  Nordhaus  et.  al.  as  a  measure  of  foreign  threat  (2012).  
They  estimate  the  ex  ante  likelihood  of  conflict,  between  dyads  using  a  well-­‐‑established  
model   of   conflict,   and   aggregate   those   likelihoods   for   each   state.   That   aggregated  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  See  their  paper  for  a  discussion  of  where  and  why  they  substitute  SIPRI  estimates  for  COW  estimates,  
and  vise  versa.    
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likelihood   is   an   estimate   of   what   the   state   in   question   believes   about   its   chances   of  
conflict,  given  what   it  knows  at   the   time.  Because   it   is  constructed  to  represent   the  ex  
ante  belief  of  leaders  about  the  likelihood  of  conflict,  it  is  an  excellent  fit  for  my  theory.    
  
Regime  Type  
I  use  Boix  et  al’s  dichotomous  coding  of  democracy  (2013).  They  evaluate  countries  
based  on  their  suffrage  and  political  competition,  coding  states  with  high  levels  of  both  
as  democracies,  and  the  remainder  as  non-­‐‑democracies.  Among  the  variety  of  possible  
measures   of   regime   type,   theirs   most   closely   captures   the   institutions   I   argue   drive  
public  accountability.    
Two  standard  measures  are  Polity  (Marshall,  Jaggers  &  Gurr  2009),  which  is  often  
used   to   represent   variation   in   regime   type,   and   W,   from   Bueno   de   Mesquita   et.   al.  
(2003),  which  measures  the  size  of  the  winning  coalition  needed  by  the  leader  to  remain  
in  power.   I   argue   that  both  mass   suffrage  and  high   levels  of  political   competition  are  
necessary  for  public  accountability  to  affect  threat  responsiveness,  making  a  continuous  
measure  unsuitable  for  my  test.  Polity  is  a  scale  from  -­‐‑10  to  10,  and  is  constructed  from  
measures   of   various   institutional   characteristics   associated   with   democracy   and  
autocracy.  Polity  captures  a  collection  of  institutions  beyond  mass  suffrage  and  political  
competition  that  do  not  apply  to  my  theory.    
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W  adopts  5  values,  from  0  to  1,  and  is  closer  theoretically  to  my  causal  story  than  
Polity.  However,  it  too  does  not  fit  the  dichotomous  structure  of  my  theory.  That  said,  
the  results  presented  below  do  not  change  substantially  if  polity  or  W  is  used  in  lieu  of  
Boix  et.  al.’s  measure  (2013).  
  
Control  Variables    
The  models  presented  include  few  control  variables,  but  the  findings  are  robust  to  
the  inclusion  of  many  others.  Each  model   includes  the  natural   log  of  real  GDP,2  and  a  
variable   that   counts   battle   deaths   as   a   percentage   of   pre-­‐‑war   population,   used   by  
Fordham   and  Walker   (2005)   to   control   for   wartime   spending.   On   each   of   these,   the  
coefficients  appear   in   line  with  existing  work.  The   inclusion  of  other  plausible  control  
variables  yields  similar  results.    
  
Estimation  Strategy  
Times   series   panel   data   can   exhibit   numerous   problems   to   effective   estimation,  
including   unit   heterogeneity,   temporal   autocorrelation,   spatial   autocorrelation,   and  
heteroskedasticity.  I  use  a  variety  of  different  models  to  address  these  concerns  in  turn,  
though  no  model  individually  addresses  all  possible  problems.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  I  again  use  Nordhaus  et.  al.’s  data  (2012),  and  refer  the  reader  to  their  article  for  a  discussion  of  its  
construction.      
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Unit  Heterogeneity  
Fixed  effects  may  attenuate   coefficient   estimates  on  variables   that   change   slowly  
over   time   but   vary   considerably   across   units.   Excluding   them   risks   omitted   variable  
bias  from  unmodeled  unit  heterogeneity.  I  estimate  two  models  with  fixed  effects,  with  
Newey  West  (Newey  and  West  1987)  and  Driscoll  Kraay  standard  errors  (Driscoll  and  
Kraay  1998).    
  
Temporal  Autocorrelation  
Military   spending   is   sticky   over   time.  What   a   country   spent   last   year   is   a   good  
predictor  of  what  they  will  spend  this  year.  That  temporal  dependence  could  be  a  result  
of  slow  moving  independent  variables,  both  within-­‐‑unit  and  external:  balance  of  power  
and   international   threat   dynamics   change   slowly.   It   could   be   part   of   the   nature   of  
military  spending  –  investment  in  weapons  systems  takes  place  over  years,  so  the  actual  
process   is  not  yearly,  even  if   the  data   is.  Finally,   it  could  be  a  product  of  bureaucratic  
dynamics   that   make   changing   the   budget   difficult.   Institutional   characteristics   may  
make  deviations  from  status  quo  spending  difficult.  Most  likely,  the  observed  temporal  
dependence  is  a  product  of  all  of  these.  Addressing  which  and  to  what  degree  is  outside  
of  the  scope  of  this  article.    
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One  common  solution   for   temporal  autocorrelation   is   to  use  a   lagged  dependent  
variable   (LDV).   The   use   of   a   lagged   dependent   variable,   however,   can   also   cause  
problems,  particularly  in  data  with  slow  moving  independent  variables,  and  can  lead  to  
erroneous   null   findings.   (Achen   2000)   Estimated   coefficients   on   variables   like   foreign  
threat,  which  are  highly  correlated  over  time,  are   likely  to  be  attenuated  when  lagged  
military   spending   is   included   in   the   model3.   However,   there   are   also   substantive  
reasons  to  include  a  lagged  dependent  variable  in  models  of  military  spending,  such  as  
the   bureaucratic   argument   mentioned   above.   Temporal   autocorrelation   might   be   a  
result   of   a   causal   process   between  military   spending   and   the   previous   years  military  
spending,   as   well   as   being   a   result   of   processes   that   are,   in   this   case,   nuisances.   I  
address  temporal  autocorrelation  in  three  ways:  with  standard  errors  that  are  robust  to  
temporal   autocorrelation   in   the   disturbances   (Newey  West   and  Driscoll-­‐‑Kraay);   with  
the  direct  inclusion  of  a  lagged  dependent  variable  in  a  Newey-­‐‑West  model;  and  with  a  
model  that  instruments  for  the  lagged  dependent  variable,  as  used  by  Nordhaus,  Oneal,  
and  Russett  (2012)  and  Conrad,  Kim,  and  Souva  (2013).  
  
Heteroskedasticity  and  Spatial  Disturbances  
I   use   regression   with   Newey   West   standard   errors   to   account   for  
heteroskedasticity   and   temporal   autocorrelation   in   the  disturbances.  To  accommodate  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Achen  discusses  work  on  arms  races  as  an  exemplar  of  this  danger.  
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the  possibility  of   further   time  dynamics,   I   include  a   lagged  dependent  variable   in  one  
model.   I  specific  a   third  model  with  Newey  West  standard  errors  and  fixed  effects,   to  
account  for  possible  omitted  variable  bias  from  unobserved  unit  heterogeneity.  Finally,  
I   use  models   with   Driscoll-­‐‑Kraay   standard   errors,   with   and  without   fixed   effects,   to  
account   for  general   temporal  and  spatial  autocorrelation,  heteroskedasticity,  and  unit-­‐‑
level  heterogeneity  (Hoechle  2007).    
  
Analysis  
Figure  1  presents  the  correlation  between  military  spending  and  the  likelihood  of  
conflict   in   democracies   and   non-­‐‑democracies,   as   well   as   some   summary   statistics   of  
military  spending  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  In  democracies,  there  is  a  strong  association  
(.57)   between   how   much   they   invest   in   their   militaries,   and   how   likely   conflict   is,  
according  to  Nordhaus  et.  al.’s  model  of  ex  ante  likelihood  (2012).  In  non-­‐‑democracies,  
the   association   is   quite   small   by   comparison   (.09) 4 .   While   not   rigorous,   these  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  If  you  use  the  natural  log  of  military  spending  instead  of  military  spending  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  the  
correlations  become  somewhat  closer,  but  still  very  far  apart,  with  .41  for  democracies  and  .16  for  non-­‐‑
democracies.  I  use  military  spending  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  for  Figure  1  because  it  allows  me  to  control  
for  GDP.  I  use  the  natural  log  of  military  spending  in  all  of  the  remaining  analysis  because  I  can  control  
for  GDP  directly,  and  still  allow  absolutely  numbers  to  matter,  and  each  additional  dollar  to  matter  less  
than  the  previous  one.    
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correlations   are   consistent   with   my   argument   –   military   spending   in   democracies   is  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  A  similar  chart  using  W  in  lieu  of  Boix  et  al.’s  (2013)  democracy  measure  supports  my  contention  that  
this  is  a  dichotomous  effect.  When  W  takes  values  of  0,  .25,  and  .5,  the  correlations  between  military  
spending  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  and  the  likelihood  of  conflict  is  .009,  .038,  and  .089  respectively.  When  
W  takes  values  of  .75  or  1  those  correlations  jump  to  .556  and  .562,  respectively.    
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Table   1   provides   the   estimates   of   six  models   that   test  my   theory  with   different  
assumptions.  Models  1-­‐‑3  use  linear  regression  with  Newey  West  standard  errors.  Model  
1   is   the   simplest   specification,   with   subsequent   models   including   additional  
components,   or   a   different   set   of   assumptions.  Model   2   includes   a   lagged  dependent  
variable   as   well   as   the   autocorrelation   in   the   disturbances.   Model   3   includes   fixed  
effects.  Model  4  presents  the  estimates  from  the  time  dynamic  model  that  instruments  
for   the   lagged   dependent   variable.   Models   5-­‐‑6   use   Driscoll-­‐‑Kraay   standard   errors  
(Hoechle   2007),   with   a   maximum   of   two   lags   for   temporal   autocorrelation   in   the  
disturbances.   Using   Driscoll-­‐‑Kraay   standard   errors   also   adjusts   for   general   spatial  
autocorrelation.  Model  6  also  includes  fixed  effects.    
  
Table  2.1:  Models  of  Ln(Military  Spending)  
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Table   2   presents   the   marginal   effect   of   a   change   in   the   regime   type   variable,  
dependent   on   the   likelihood   of   conflict,   and   vice   versa.   The   bolded   coefficients   are  
statistically   significant   at   the   p<.05   level.   Across   all   of   the   models,   democracy   has   a  
negative   and   statistically   significant   effect  when   conflict   is   unlikely.  Across   all   of   the  
models,  the  likelihood  of  conflict  has  a  positive  and  statistically  significant  effect  when  
the   state   is   democratic.   The   estimated   effect   of   democracy   when   conflict   is   likely   is  
positive   in   all   of   the  models,   but   only   statistically   significantly   distinct   from   zero   in  
Model  4.  The  effect  of  the  likelihood  of  conflict  is  statistically  significant  and  positive  in  
Models  1  and  5.    
Table  2.2:  Marginal  Effects  
  
Figures  2  and  3  show  the  estimated  marginal  effects  visually.  Figure  2  presents  the  
marginal  effect  of  democracy  over  different  levels  of  threat.  The  effect  of  changing  from  
a  non-­‐‑democracy  to  a  democracy  is  negative  and  significantly  different  from  zero  when  
conflict  is  unlikely.  As  conflict  becomes  more  likely,  the  effect  of  democracy  diminishes  to  
zero.   While   it   is   above   zero   on   the   far   right,   it   is   not   statistically   significant.   The  
increased  responsiveness  of  democracies  means  that  regime  type  during  times  of  high  
threat  does  not  affect  military  spending.  Changing  the  regime  of  a  state  when  conflict  is  
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very  likely  is  unlikely  to  shift  its  aggregate  military  spending.  Similarly,  Figure  3  shows  
the   average   marginal   effect   of   the   likelihood   of   conflict   in   democracies   and   non-­‐‑
democracies.   It   is   positive   in   democracies,   but   smaller   and   not   significantly   different  
than  zero  in  non-­‐‑democracies.  In  short,  as  Figure  1  suggested,  the  likelihood  of  conflict  
matters  more  to  the  level  of  military  spending  of  democratic  states  than  non-­‐‑democratic  
ones.    
Figures  2.2  and  2.3  
  
Figure   4   shows   the   average   predicted   natural   log   of   military   spending   for  
democracies   and   non-­‐‑democracies,   over   the   likelihood   of   conflict,   with   all   other  
variables  held  at  their  means.  As  the  marginal  effects  charts  suggest,  democracies  spend  
less  in  times  of  low  threat,  but  increase  their  spending  more  as  the  likelihood  of  conflict  
increases.   In   times   of   high   threat,   an   average   state   would   spend   more   if   it   is   a  
democracy  than  if  it  is  a  non-­‐‑democracy,  but  not  by  a  statistically  significant  amount.    




I   evaluate   two   possible   alternative   explanations   for   the   findings   above   by  
replicating  my  tests  with  alternative  independent  variables.  By  showing  that  plausible  
alternative   explanations   for   the   evidence   above   do   not   wash   out   the   effect   of   my  
measure   of   democracy   on   responsiveness,   I   strengthen   my   empirical   results,   and  
provide  additional  support  for  my  argument,    
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Public  and  Elite  Accountability  
One  possible  alternative  explanation  is  that  the  variation  between  regime  types  is  
actually   a   product   of   differences   between   types   of   autocratic   regimes,   rather   than  
between   democracies   and   non-­‐‑democracies.   I   argue   that   public   accountability   causes  
democratic  regimes  to  respond  more  than  non-­‐‑democratic  regimes  to  the  probability  of  
conflict.   It   is   possible   that   accountability,   elite   or   public,   is   the   cause   of   different  
responsiveness.  In  that  case,  democracies  would  still  appear  to  be  more  responsive  than  
autocracies,   when   the   autocracies   are   grouped   together.   If   the   relevant   divide   is  
between   regimes   with   accountable   leaders   and   those   without,   and   all   democratic  
leaders  are  accountable,  while  only  some  autocrats  are  accountable,  the  autocratic  states  
are   going   to   have   on   average   lower   levels   of   responsiveness,   even   if   the   accountable  
autocracies  are  identical  in  responsiveness  to  democracies.  This  argument  follows  work  
by  Weeks  (2012).  She  argues  that  the  selectorate/winning  coalition  model  by  Bueno  de  
Mesquita   et.   al.   (2003)   underestimates   the   durability   of   elites   in   many   autocratic  
regimes.  Elites  in  some  regimes  have  less  stake  in  the  particular  leader  than  selectorate  
theory   assumes.   In   such   cases,   the   elite   domestic   audience   can   replace   the   leader   for  
poor  performance.  She  further  argues  that,  in  many  such  regimes,  there  is  little  reason  
to  believe  that  the  small,  elite  domestic  audience  will  be  less  conflict  averse  than  a  broad  
audience   of   voters.   As   a   result,   some   autocracies   will   be   no   more   likely   to   initiate  
conflicts  than  democracies  (Weeks  2012).    
33  	  	  
I   examine   variation   in   autocratic   regimes   for   evidence   of   accountability   versus  
public   accountability   using   data   from   Weeks   (2012).   Her   personalist/non-­‐‑personalist  
dimension   captures  whether   the   leader   of   the   regime   is   subject   to   an   elite   audience.  
Personalist   leaders   are   unrestricted,  while   others   have   to   answer   to   either   civilian   or  
military  elites.  In  non-­‐‑personalist  regimes,  there  is  little  reason  to  expect  behavior  which  
is  much  different  than  democracies,  she  argues6.  If  Weeks  is  correct,  the  predicted  effect  
of   democracy   –   negative   in   times   of   low   threat,   but  magnifying   the   effect   of   external  
threat   –   should   be   observed,   but   only   in   contrast   to   personalist   autocracies.   Regimes  
that   have   elite   domestic   audiences   that   can   hold   the   leader   accountable   should   act  
similarly.  The  provision  of  national  security  because  it  is  a  public  good  cannot  account  
for   such   an   effect   in   small   winning   coalition   regimes.   An   examination   of   autocratic  
variation,   then,   can   help   distinguish   between   the   effect   of   political   institutions  
incentivizing  public  good  provision  from  their  effect  on  incentivizing  good  governance.  
In   the   former,  democracies  behave  differently   than  non-­‐‑personalist  autocracies.   In   the  
latter,  they  may  not.  If  Weeks’  argument  is  correct,  the  effect  of  public  accountability  I  
observe   in   Models   1-­‐‑6   is   really   driven   by   the   effect   of   accountability   that   separates  
democratic  and  non-­‐‑personalist  regimes  from  personalist  regimes.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  In  military  regimes,  you  might  see  more  conflict  propensity  (as  she  finds),  but  it  is  not  
a  result  of  the  domestic  audience  being  attached  to  the  leader.  Rather,  it  is  a  product  of  a  
military  audience  being  more  acceptant  of  the  use  of  military  force  as  a  policy  tool  than  
a  non-­‐‑military  audience.    
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Security  as  a  Public  Good  and  Specific  Consequences  of  Conflict  
My  argument   is   closely   tied   to   the   literature   on   conflict   as   costly   for  democratic  
leaders.  Part  of  that  story  is  the  role  of  security  as  a  public  good.  However,  there  is  more  
to  my  argument  than  the  statement  that  democratic  leaders  provide  more  public  goods.  
Public  accountability  requires  that  the  public  can  observe  the  performance  of  the  leader.  
Public  accountability  makes  leaders  more  sensitive  to  publically  visible  policy  failures.  
As  a  result,  democratic  leaders  are  more  responsive  to  threats  that  are  observable  to  the  
public.  While   both   the   probability   of  manifestation   and   the   severity   of   the   threat   are  
important,   public   accountability   makes   leaders   particularly   sensitive   to   the   former.  
While   any   conception  of   threat   ought,   as  Walt   argues,   to   include  both   the   intent   and  
capacity   to  harm,  democratic   leaders  are  disproportionately   concerned  with   intent,   as  
intent  is  more  representative  of  the  likelihood  of  a  threat  manifesting,  while  capacity  is  
more  associated  with  severity.  
Militarized   conflict   is   the   most   visible   instance   of   the   manifestation   of   foreign  
threat,  and  how  the  state  performs  in  that  conflict  is  important  for  leader  tenure  (see,  for  
example,   Croco   2011).   If   there   are   security   concerns   that   the   public   is   unlikely   to  
observe,  I  do  not  expect  public  accountability  to  lead  to  greater  responsiveness  to  those  
concerns.  Conflict  is  not  the  only  security  policy  visible  to  the  public,  but  it  is  the  most  
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important.   I   find   that   the   coefficient   on   the   likelihood   of   conflict   yields   is   larger   for  
democratic   states   than   non-­‐‑democratic   states.   That   result   conforms   my   argument.  
However,   the  test  provided  by  Models  1-­‐‑6  does  not  distinguish  between  an  argument  
about   the   general   provision   of   public   goods,   and   the   narrower   claim   I   make,   about  
responsiveness  to  the  possibility  of  conflict  specifically.    
  Democratic  leaders  respond  more  because  international  security  is  a  public  good,  
but  only  do  so  when  the  threat  is  likely  to  be  observable.  A  similar  result  could  be  found  
for  other  reasons.  Perhaps  the  visibility  is  not  crucial,  and  democracies  respond  more  to  
all  types  of  threats,  either  because  international  security  is  a  public  good,  independent  
of  observability,  or  for  some  other  reason  not  discussed  here.  To  evaluate  that,  I  include  
an  alternative  measure  of  foreign  threat  in  a  series  of  tests,  and  interact  it  with  regime  
type.   I  use  Fordham  and  Walker’s   (2005)  measure  of   the   total   capabilities   of   strategic  
rivals  for  one  alternative  measure  of  threat  environment,  and  Nordhaus  et.  al.’s  (2012)  
measure   of   the   aggregated  military   spending   of   the   state’s   potential   foes   (states  with  
dissimilar   alliance   portfolios)   as   another.   Neither   measure   focuses   on   intent   like  
Nordhaus  et.  al.’s  measure  of  the  probability  of  conflict,  though  both  capture  aspects  of  
the  general  strategic  environment  of  the  state.  Aggregating  the  CINC  scores  of  the  rivals  
allows  for  variation  between  states  with  just  one  major  threat,  those  with  many,  and  the  
relative  power  of   those   threats.  The   aggregate  measure  of  military   spending  of   states  
with   dissimilar   alliance   portfolios   captures   threat   environment   in   a   general   manner,  
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without   focusing  on  particular  enemies.  Most   importantly,  members  of   the  public  are  
unlikely   to   be   aware   of   shifts   in   global   aggregate  military   spending   or   rival  material  
capacity.  The  public  is  more  likely  to  know  about  the  outbreak  and  outcome  of  war.    
If   democracies   respond  more   to   threats   only   because   security   is   a   public   good,  
regardless  of  whether  it  is  observable  to  the  public  or  not,  then  the  strategic  rivals  and  
aggregated  military   spending   of   foes  models   ought   to   exhibit   similar   findings   to   the  
likelihood  of  conflict  models.  On  the  other  hand,  null  or  contrasting  results  suggest  that  
the  effect  of  public  accountability  on  threat  response   is  particular  to  the  probability  of  
conflict,  and  not  to  other  types  of  foreign  threat.    
  
Results  
Table  3  summarizes  the  results  of  three  models  similar  to  Models  1,  4  and  5.  Each  
model   includes   the   variable   personalist/non-­‐‑personalist   and   its   interaction   with   the  
likelihood  of  conflict.  The  aggregated  capability  of  strategic  rivals  and  the  natural  log  of  
aggregated   foe   military   spending,   and   their   interactions   with   democracy,   are   also  
included.   All   of   the   results   remain   substantively   the   same   when   each   alternative  
independent  variable  and  its  interaction  is  included  in  separate  models.    
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Table  2.3:  Models  of  Ln(Military  Spending)  
  
The  negative  effect  of  democracy  and  the  magnifying  effect  of  democracy  on   the  
effect  of  likelihood  of  conflict  are  found  in  all  of  the  models.  Personalist  regimes  do  not  
appear  to  respond  differently  than  other  regimes,  and  their  inclusion  does  not  wipe  out  
the   effect   of   democracy.   The   evidence   demonstrates   that   there   is   an   effect   of   public  
accountability,  rather  than  elite  accountability.    
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Democracies  appear  to  be  less  responsive  to  other  measures  of  threat,  not  more.  It  
is  only   the  possibility  of  conflict,  with  all   its  potential  costs,   to  which  democracies  are  
particularly   responsive.   This   suggests   that   democracies   are,   as   I   argue,   particularly  
sensitive  to   threatening   intent,  rather   than  capacity,  and  primarily  concerned  with  the  
potential  outbreak  and  outcome  of  conflict.      
  
Democratic  Military  Spending  and  Victory  
I  argue  that  military  spending  in  democracies   is  driven  by  leader  concerns  about  
the   political   costs   of   conflict   and   conflict   outcomes.   Accordingly,   I   expect   military  
spending   by   democracies   to   have   a   greater   effect   on   conflict   outcomes   than  military  
spending   in   non-­‐‑democracies,   where   military   spending   serves   other   purposes.   To  
evaluate  this  claim,  I  use  data  from  Bennett  and  Stam  (1998)  on  wars  between  1823  and  
1990,   coded   for   outcome,  military   spending,   and   regime   type.   The  military   spending  
data  comes  from  Nordhaus,  Oneal  and  Russett  (Nordhaus  et.  al.  2012),  while  the  regime  
type  data   is   the   same  as  above,   from  Boix  et  al.   (2013).  There  are  105  dyad-­‐‑war-­‐‑years  
that  meet  all  the  criteria.  I  am  interested  in  the  effect  target  military  spending  has  on  the  
likelihood  of   initiator  victory.   Initiators  know  how  much  of   their   spending   is   focused  
towards  foreign  conflict,  and  make  their  decisions  with  that  knowledge.  As  a  result,  the  
effect   of   their   military   spending   on   victory   may   reside   primarily   in   the   initiator  
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advantage7.  Target  states,  on  the  other  hand,  have  less  agency  in  selecting  into  the  war  
(though   not   none).   Accordingly,   the   effect   of   military   spending   on   victory   is   better  
represented  in  target  states  than  initiator  states.  If  democratic  military  spending  is,  as  I  
argue  and  the  above  evidence  suggests,  more  directed  towards  the  building  of  military  
capacity  than  autocratic  military  spending,  military  spending  in  democratic  target  states  
ought   to  have  a  greater   impact  on   the   likelihood  of  conflict   than  military  spending   in  
autocratic  target  states.    
  
Hypothesis:   Military   spending   in   democratic   target   states   will   suppress   the   likelihood   of  
initiator  victory  more  than  military  spending  in  autocratic  target  states.    
  
Figure  5  provides  a  first  look  at  my  hypothesis,  as  well  as  a  summary  of  the  data.  Each  
histogram   has   the   distribution   of   target   logged   military   spending.   The   military  
spending  of  democratic  targets  who  lose  is  in  the  lower  right  corner.  Note  that  it  is  more  
narrow,   and   clustered   on   the   left,   compared   to   democratic   targets   who   do   not   lose,  
indicating   that   democratic   targets   who   lose   typically   spend   less.   There   are   no  
observations   of   democratic   targets   that   lose   and   spend   (comparatively)   a   lot   on   their  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  One  possible  implication  of  this  is  that  the  better  a  state  selects  which  conflicts  to  initiate,  the  less  
independent  effect  its  own  military  spending  ought  to  have.    
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military.      In   contrast,   non-­‐‑democratic   targets   look   roughly   the   same   whether   the  
initiator  wins  or  not.    
Figure  2.5  
  
For  a  more  rigorous  evaluation,  I  estimate  three  models,  using  initiator  victory  for  
the   dependent   variable.   The   first   model   is   a   logit   with   regime   type   and   the   logged  
military  spending  of  each  participant.  The  second  is  a  logit  model  with  the  interaction  
of  each  state’s  regime  type  and  logged  military  spending.  The  third  is  a  heteroscedastic  
probit,  which   I   include   to   account   directly   for   heterscedasticity   that  might   otherwise  
create  inconsistent  and  inefficient  estimates  (Green  2003).  The  substantive  implications  
of  the  third  model  are  equivalent  to  the  first,  so  I  present  marginal  effects  and  predicted  







5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20
Target Not Dem, Initiator Doesn't Win Target Not Dem, Initiator Wins




Logged Military Spending of Target
Graphs by democracy and win
41  	  	  
Table  2.4:  Models  of  Conflict  Outcome  
  
  
Figure  6  shows  the  estimated  marginal  effect  of  the  target  state’s  (logged)  military  
spending  on   the  probability  of   initiator  victory   for  democracies  and  non-­‐‑democracies.  
As  predicted,  the  effect  for  democracies  is  negative  and  statistically  significant,  and  of  a  
greater   magnitude   than   the   effect   in   non-­‐‑democracies,   which   is   not   statistically  
significant  to  the  .05  level.    
  






Figure  7  provides  estimates  of  predicted  probabilities   for   initiation  victory  across  
target   spending   levels   for   democracies   and   non-­‐‑democracies.   There   is   a   considerable  
decrease   in   the   likelihood  of   initiator  victory  as  democratic   target   spending   increases.  
Non-­‐‑democratic   targets   are   less   likely   to   lose   initially,   but   see   little   change   in   that  
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Discussion  
In  democracies,  domestic  politics  do  not,  in  and  of  themselves,  determine  foreign  
policy.   They   shape   how   governments   respond   to   their   security   environment.  
Democratic  states  invest  more  in  their  militaries  in  response  to  likely  conflict  than  non-­‐‑
democracies.   These   findings   update   the   literature   in   a   number   of  ways.   First,   I   show  
that   democracy   only   has   a   dampening   effect   on   aggregate   military   spending   when  
conflict  is  unlikely.  The  previous  argument  that  democracy  is  pacifying  requires,  at  least  
in  the  context  of  military  spending,  a  significant  caveat.  Far  from  being  naturally  more  
pacific,   democracies   arm  more  when   conflict   appears   likely,   even   as   they   spend   less  
when  not   threatened.  They  adapt  more   to   the  probability  of  conflict   than  other  states.  
While  some  literature  suggests  that  democracies  do  try  harder  during  war,  as  argued  by  
Bueno  de  Mesquita  et  al.,  (2003)  and  Goldsmith  (2007),  I  find  that  their  increased  effort  
by   democracies   extends   to   likelihood   of   conflict,   even   in   times   of   peace.   This   is   in  
keeping  with   the   insights  of  Clauswitz,   and  more   recently  Wagner   (2000)   and  others.  
War   is  an  extension  of  politics,   rather   than  a  wholly  distinct  process.   I  argue  that   it   is  
specifically   public   accountability   that   drives  democracy’s   effect   on  military   spending.  
When   the   likelihood   of   conflict   increases,   leaders   subject   to   public   accountability  
increase  their  military  spending.  When  the  likelihood  of  conflict  decreases,  they  cut  it.  
Autocratic  military  spending,  even  when  the  leader  can  be  held  accountable,  is  a  result  
of  some  other  process.  Both  type  of  states  may  appear  to  be  spending  similar  amounts  
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in  a  high  threat  environment,  but  as  Figure  4  shows,  they  got  to  that  level  of  spending  
in  different  ways.    
Democratic  spending  is  driven  by  a  political  need  for  success  in,  or  avoidance  of,  
international   conflict.   Because   democratic   military   spending   is   directed   towards  
deterring  and  winning  wars,  democratic  targets  become  less  likely  to  lose  wars  as  they  
spend  more.    That  helps  explain  why  democracies  appear  to  fight  better,  despite  mixed  
evidence  of   trying  harder   (Reiter  and  Stam  2002).  Autocratic  military  spending  serves  
purposes  other  than  war  fighting,  and  so  has  a  limited  effect  on  war  outcomes.    
My  findings  show  that,  as  suggested  by  Figure  1,  democratic  military  spending  is  
closely   related   to   the   security   environment,   particularly   the  possibility   of  war.   Public  
accountability  causes  democratic   leaders   to  be  more  sensitive   to   the  costs  of  war,  and  
therefore  more   responsive   to   the   likelihood  of  war.   To  understand   the   importance   of  
regime  characteristics  to  foreign  policy,  future  work  needs  to  account  for  the  interaction  
of  the  institutions  of  the  state  with  the  environment  of  the  state.  
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Chapter  3:  Domestic  Politics  and  Arming  in  Autocracies:  




I   argue   that   autocratic   leaders   use   military   spending   as   a   way   of   buying   support.  
Institutional  differences  between  regimes  affect  the  degree  to  which  they  do  so,  and  so  
explain   some   variation   in   military   spending   across   states.   Military   elites   can   extract  
rents  directly  when   involved   in  non-­‐‑military   aspects   of   the   government,  making   side  
payments  through  the  military  budget  less  necessary.  As  a  result,  military  participation  
in   government   reduces   military   spending,   with   one   exception.   Immediately   after   a  
transition   to   a   military   regime   from   a   civilian   one,   military   leaders   pay   off   their  
supporters   in   lower   levels   of   the   military.   This   results   in   a   one-­‐‑time   increase   in  
spending.   The   negative   effect   of   military   regime   on   military   spending   increases   in  
magnitude   as   the   regime   ages.   These   findings   contradict   the   existing   literature  
empirically,  and  suggests  that  constituency  and  bureaucratic  “you  stand  where  you  sit”  
arguments  warrant  reconsideration,  particularly  in  light  of  the  variety  of  ways  in  which  
a  supporter  can  be  rewarded.    
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How  does  military  involvement  in  governance  affect  military  spending?  The  first  
paper  of   this  dissertation   shows   that  democracies   invest   in   their  militaries  differently  
than   autocracies,   spending   less   on   average,   but   responding  more   to   foreign   threat.   I  
argue   that   autocratic   leaders   use   military   spending   as   a   way   of   buying   support.  
Institutional  differences  between  regimes  affect  the  degree  to  which  they  do  so,  and  so  
explain  some  variation  in  military  spending  across  autocratic  states.  Military  elites  can  
extract  rents  directly  when  involved  in  non-­‐‑military  aspects  of  the  government,  making  
side   payments   through   the   military   budget   less   necessary.   As   a   result,   military  
participation  in  government  reduces  military  spending.    
  
Review  of  the  Literature  
Variation  in  military  spending  has  numerous  causes.  In  much  of  the  literature  on  
military   spending   and   international   relations,   military   spending   is   shown   to   be   a  
response   to   foreign   threats,   particularly   from   other   countries.   That   contention   (Waltz  
1979,   Walt   1990),   is   the   basis   for   the   considerable   body   of   work   on   arms   races  
(Richardson,   Glaser   2000,   Morrow   1993),   and   has   been   subject   to   recent   empirical  
evaluation  (Nordhaus  et.  al.  2012,  Goldsmith  2003,  Dunne  et.  al.  2007,  Rosh  1988).  The  
military  provides  security  by  increasing  the  capacity  of  the  state  to  inflict  costs  through  
violence,   and   by   preventing   costs   from   violence,   either   through   deterrence   or   direct  
prevention.    
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Recent   literature   on   military   spending   in   autocratic   states   focuses   primarily   on  
domestic  causes  of  military  spending.  Kim,  Kim,  and  Lee  (2013),  for  example,  find  that  
military  regimes  that  come  to  power  as  a  result  of  coups  spend  more  on  their  military  
than  other  autocratic  regimes.  They  argue  that  military  spending  is  a  way  of  rewarding  
core  supporters.  Bueno  de  Mesquita  and  Siverson  (2009),  when  discussing  leader  tenure  
and  institutional  change,  echo  that  sentiment:    
“Hence   in   democratic   systems,   while   some,   such   as   defense   contractors,  
benefit   privately   from   the   provision   of   security,   the   focus   of   defense  
spending  is  to  protect  the  nation  from  a  foreign  threat.  In  contrast,  in  small  
winning-­‐‑coalition   systems,   the   policy   focus   is   skewed   toward   private  
goods-­‐‑bloated   procurement   contracts   for   cronies,   and   luxuries   for   offices  
are  more   important   than  an  effective   fighting   force.”   (Bueno  de  Mesquita  
and  Siverson,  2009.  pg  937)    
  
Conrad,   Kim   and   Souva   (2013)   similarly   argue   that   political   participation  
influences   variation   in   military   spending   across   autocracies.   According   to   their  
argument,  variation  in  military  spending  is  driven  by  the  degree  to  which  the  leader  is  
answerable  to  narrow  interests,  and  the  age  of  the  regime.  As  the  interests  of  the  regime  
get  narrower,  military  spending   increases.  As  a  regime  gets  older,   the   leader  becomes  
more  secure  in  her  authority,  which  also  increases  spending  (because  the  military  is  no  
longer  seen  as  a  significant  threat  to  her  power).    
Powell,   in   his   discussion   of   coup   proofing,   summarizes   the  work   on   coups   and  
military  spending  thusly:    
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“Short-­‐‑term  increases  in  material  or  financial  incentives  send  a  clear  signal  
to   the   armed   forces   that   their   interests   are   being   taken   into   account.   This  
should  greatly  reduce  the  expected  pay  off  from  a  coup,  rendering  one  less  
likely.”  (Powell  2012)  
  
Powell   goes   on   to   argue   that   sharing   spoils   with   the   military   is   one   of   two   general  
strategies  for  avoiding  coups.  The  other  is  changing  the  structure  of  the  state’s  security  
apparatus,  which   increases   the   cost   of   staging  a   coup  and  decreases   the   likelihood  of  
success.   Roessler   (2011)   makes   a   similar   point   –   governments   exclude   ethnic   groups  
because   exclusion   decreases   coup   risk,   even   though   it   increases   the   risk   of   civil  war.  
Fractionalization  and  exclusion,  along  structural  or  ethnic  lines,  of  the  military  has  both  
costs  and  benefits.    
Recent   work   on   autocratic   variation   and   foreign   policy   is   also   relevant.   For  
example,   Weeks   argues   that   the   selectorate/winning   coalition   model   by   Bueno   de  
Mesquita   et.   al.   (2003)   underestimates   the   durability   of   elites   in   many   autocratic  
regimes.  Elites  in  some  regimes  have  less  stake  in  the  particular  leader  than  selectorate  
theory   assumes.   In   such   cases,   the   elite   domestic   audience   can   replace   the   leader  
without  the  elites  losing  their  positions.  She  further  argues  that,  in  many  such  regimes,  
there  is  little  reason  to  believe  that  the  small,  elite  domestic  audience  will  be  less  conflict  
averse   than  a  broad  audience  of  voters.  As  a  result,  some  autocracies  will  be  no  more  
likely  to  initiate  conflicts  than  democracies  (Weeks  2012).  
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Finally,   my   argument   is   informed   by   recent   work   on   autocratic   variation   that  
emphasizes   the   different   tools   leaders   use   to   remain   in   power.   Work   on   autocratic  
institutions  and  leader  tenure  identifies  two  threats  leaders  contend  with  –  those  from  
elites   within   the   government,   and   mass   revolution   from   outside   the   government.  
Gandhi  and  Przeworski  put  it  bluntly:  “Autocrats  face  two  types  of  threats  to  their  rule:  
those   that   emerge   from   within   the   ruling   elite   and   those   that   come   from   outsiders  
within   society.”   (2007)   Svolik   calls   these   challenges   “the   problem   of   authoritarian  
power-­‐‑sharing”   and   the   “problem   of   authoritarian   control.”   (Svolik   2012)   These   dual  
threats   closely   resemble   Rossler’s   trade-­‐‑off   between   coups   and   civil   war   threats,  
mentioned  above.    
Authoritarian   leaders’   use   of   legislatures   and   party   systems   to   co-­‐‑opt   possible  
opponents   (Svolik   2012),   mitigate   commitment   and   monitoring   problems   (Magaloni  
2008,  Boix  and  Svolik,  Svolik  2012),  and  distribute  private  goods  (Wright)  occupy  much  
of   the   recent  work.  Wright,   for   example,  discusses  how   the  use  of   legislatures  differs  
across  regime  types.  Personalist  regimes  use  them  to  distribute  private  benefits,  while  in  
non-­‐‑personalist   regimes,   legislatures   are   a   mechanism   for   constraining   the   leader  
(Wright  2008).    
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Theory  
Autocratic   leaders   have   two   primary   goals   –   to   remain   in   power   and   to   extract  
rents.   They   face   two   threats   to   remaining   in   power,   public   uprisings   and   elite  
overthrow   (revolts   and   coups).   To  deal  with   these   threats,   they  use   a   combination   of  
sticks,   in   the   form   of   repression,   and   carrots,   in   the   form   of   spoils   and   policy  
concessions.  The  relative  use  of  these  tools  is  shaped  by  the  circumstances  of  the  leader,  
and  the  institutions  around  them,  be  they  inherited  or  constructed  by  the  leader  and  her  
allies  to  solve  a  particular  problem.    
Political  actors   in  autocratic   regimes   face  a  potential   commitment  problem  when  
making  power  and  spoil-­‐‑sharing  agreements.  Once  a  leader  wields  some  of  the  levers  of  
power,  she  can  use  them  to  solidify  her  position,  at  the  expense  of  others.  Many  elites  
have   no   recourse   against   abuse   from   the   leader,   though   in   some   governments,  
legislatures  can  create   trust  and  facilitate  bargaining  between  the   leader  and  potential  
rivals   (Svolik   2012).      Military   elites,   on   the   other   hand,   always   have   the   option   of  
intervening   violently.   Interventions   are   costly,   and   vary   in   their   success   rate,   so  
members   of   the  military   are  not   eager   to  use   them,   but   the  potential   for   intervention  
diminishes   their   risk   of   exploitation   by   the   leader.   That   allows   them   to   form   more  
credible   agreements   with   the   leader,   and   extract   payments,   even   from   otherwise  
unconstrained   leaders.   It  also  may   increase   the   incentive  of   the   leader   to  organize  her  
government  in  ways  that  diminish  the  likelihood  of  successful  coups  (coup  proofing).    
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Paying  off  the  military  
Militaries   are  multifaceted   organizations   and   often   feature   numerous   competing  
factions.  I  assume  a  relatively  simple  structure  that  distinguishes  between  military  elites  
and  rank  and  file  members.  These  elites  and  rank  and  file  members  differ  in  the  manner  
in  which   they   can   be   bought.   Elite   actors   care   about   policy   concessions   and   political  
authority,   as   well   as   side   payments,   because   they   can   use   both   to   extract   rents   for  
themselves,   while   rank   and   file   members   care   primarily   about   direct   income,   which  
comes  in  the  form  of  military  spending.    
Military  elites,  like  other  elites,  want  primarily  two  things:  to  remain  in  power,  and  
to  extract  rents.  Unlike  other  elites,  they  have  particular  authority  within  the  apparatus  
of   violence   within   the   state.   As   a   result,   even   when   they   are   not   part   of   the   formal  
governing  apparatus,  they  possess  leverage  over  the  leader.  The  military  functions  as  a  
coercive   tool   against  political   and   civilian   elites,   and   is   a   source  of  protection   against  
public  uprising.  It   is  also  capable  of   intervening  violently  against  the  leader.  They  use  
that  leverage  to  demand  a  share  of  the  profits  of  governing.  When  they  are  outside  of  
the  policy-­‐‑making  process,   that  side  payment  manifests  as  military  spending.  Military  
spending,  then,  is  a  form  of  distributive  politics  in  autocratic  regimes.  This  has  several  
implications  that  may  not  be  immediately  apparent.    
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Military  Spending  in  Civilian  Regimes  
Civilian  leaders  and  elites  want  to  avoid  military  intervention  in  the  government.  
Military   interventions   often   result   in   the   replacement   of   the   leader,   and  diminish   the  
power  of  non-­‐‑military  elites.  Militaries  that  are  not  already  politicized  typically  wish  to  
avoid  intervention,  which  is  costly  and  can  reveal  political  fissures  within  the  military  
itself  (Svolik  2012).  At  the  same  time,  military  actors  wish  to  reap  the  rewards  of  office,  
and   civilian   leadership   depends   on   the   military   as   the   repressive   apparatus   of   last  
resort.  Accordingly,  the  civilian  government  funnels  money  to  the  military  in  sufficient  
quantity   to   offset   any   gains   the   military   might   receive   from   intervention,   and   to  
guarantee  the  support  of  the  military  in  case  of  domestic  opposition.  Military  spending,  
then,  functions  as  coup  proofing  through  distributive  politics.    
  
Military  Spending  in  Military  Regimes  
Once   the  military   has   intervened   in   politics,   continued   intervention   is   likely,   as  
some  of  the  costs  have  already  been  paid,  and  the  wall  between  the  military  and  the  rest  
of   the   policy   apparatus   has   broken   down.      Holding   office   allows   military   elites   to  
extract  rents  directly,  granting  them  independent  revenue  streams  and  political  power.  
Military  spending  becomes   less   important  as  a  side  payment  –   the  gains  of  governing  
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are   available   to   military   elites   directly.   The   more   involved   the   military   is   in   the  
governance  of   the  state  beyond  military  matters,   the  more   it   is  able   to  directly  extract  
rents  from  that  process,   just  like  other  political  elites.  Military  involvement  also  grants  
military   elites   control   over   public   policy.   In   a   military   regime,   military   elites   have  
acquired  two  new  forms  of  reimbursement:  policy  concessions,  and  direct  rent  seeking.  
These   make   side-­‐‑payments   through   military   spending   less   important.   As   a   result,  
military  regimes  will  spend  less  on  the  military  than  civilian  regimes.  
H1.  Military  spending  will  be  negatively  associated  with  military  regimes.  
Hypothesis   1   is   at   odds   with   existing   literature,   which   expects   that   military  
interventions   will   be   associated   with   increases   in   spending   (Kim   et   al.   2013),   or  
unrelated  to  military  spending  (Conrad  et  al  2013).   I  believe  these  conflicting  findings  
are  a  result  of  conflating  the  different  effects  of  regime  change  and  regime  type.  
  
Regime  Change:  Becoming  a  Military  Regime  
Shifts  to  and  from  military  regimes  have  separate  effects  from  the  general  effect  of  
being   a  military   regime.  When  military   leaders   first   come   to  power,   either   through   a  
coup,   or   in   lieu   of   a   coup,   they   typically  do   so  with   the   support   of   the   rank   and   file  
members  of  the  military.  This  leads  to  an  increase  in  military  spending.  One  reason  the  
military  would  stage  a  coup  is  because  it  is  not  being  sufficiently  paid  off.  So,  post-­‐‑coup  
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rents  for  military  elites  ought  to  increase.  On  its  own,  that  may  not  be  associated  with  
an   increase   in   spending,   because   the   elites   can   extract   rents   directly   once   they   are  
participants   in   the  government.  However,   staging  a  coup  also  requires   the  support  of  
the   rank   and   file   of   the   military,   which   requires   paying   them   as   well.   Accordingly,  
immediate  post-­‐‑coup  politics  demand  increased  funds  directed  specifically  toward  the  
military.  At  moment   right   before   and   after   a   coup,   the   rank   and   file  members   of   the  
military  are  at  the  height  of  their  leverage  –  they  can  decide  whether  to  back  a  military  
leader  and  which  military  leader  to  support.  As  a  result,  the  leader  needs  to  reward  the  
rank   and   file   shortly   after   coming   to   power,   and   typically   does   so   financially8.   Over  
time,   because   military   elites   can   extract   increased   rents   directly   and   command   the  
loyalty  of  the  rank  and  file,  a  military  autocratic  regime  will  spend  less  on  its  military  
than   a   civilian   autocratic   regime.   In   the   short   term,  post   coup,  military   elites   need   to  
funnel  money  directly   to   their  broader  base  of   support  –   the  military  public.9  I   expect  
this  to  be  particularly  true  when  the  military  ceases  direct  control  over  the  government.    
H2.  Transitioning  from  a  civilian  to  a  military  regime  will  increase  military  spending.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Roman  Emperors  made  one  time  payments  to  soldiers  called  donatives  or  donativums,  often  
immediately  upon  coming  to  power.  (Ng  2012)  
9  A  similar,  but  reversed,  dynamic  takes  place  in  transitions  from  military  regimes  to  civilian  ones.  Such  
transitions  require  diminishing  the  military  as  a  meaningful  political  institution.    A  period  of  defunding  
after  a  transition  from  a  military  regime  is  likely.    
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Regime  Change:  Becoming  a  Civilian  Autocratic  Regime  
Civilian   autocratic   leaders,   like  military   leaders,   wish   to   consolidate   power   and  
extract   rents.   While   some   support   from   the   military   is   always   necessary,   leaders   in  
civilian   autocratic   regimes   draw   their   support   from   civilian   elites   and   publics.   Once  
they   are   in   power,   leaders  will  want   to   replace   current  military   leaders  with   leaders  
who   are   loyal   to   them,   and   purge   the   military   of   potential   rivals.   When   a   military  
regime  transitions  to  a  civilian  regime,  it  will  be  associated  with  a  one-­‐‑time  decrease  in  
military   spending  as  potential   rivals  are  eliminated.  Over   time   in  a   civilian  autocratic  
regime,  military  spending  may  again  increase,  as  the  new  military  leaders  solidify  their  
position,  and  the  civilian  leader  and  elites  increase  military  spending  as  a  side  payment  
and  in  response  to  risk10.    
H3.  Transitioning  from  a  military  to  a  civilian  regime  will  decrease  military  spending.  
Regime  Age  
   Conrad   et.   al.   (2013)   argue   that   as   regimes   age,   and   the   leader   solidifies   her  
position,   the   interests   she   serves   narrow,   and   this   leads   to   an   increase   in   military  
spending.  I  agree  that  military  influence  increases  relative  to  other  interests  in  regimes  
as  they  age.  In  civilian  authoritarian  regimes,  that  means  increased  military  spending  as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  Civilian  leaders  cut  spending  initially  because  they  distrust  the  previous  military  elites.  While  new  
military  elites  may  consolidate  their  positions  over  time  (leading  to  increased  side  payments),  they  are  
still  perceived  by  the  leader  as  more  loyal  to  the  regime,  allowing  other  factors  (such  as  foreign  threat)  to  
lead  to  increased  spending  over  time  as  well.    
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a   side   payment   to   military   elites.   In   civilian   autocratic   regimes,   regime   age   will   be  
positively  related  to  military  spending,  as  Conrad  et.  al.  argue  (2013).    
H4:  As  regime  age  increases  in  civilian  regimes,  so  will  military  spending.    
I  argue  that  those  side  payments  are  unnecessary  in  military  regimes,  because  the  
military   elites   can   extract   benefits   directly.   As   military   leaders   consolidate   their  
position,   their   need   to   pay   the   rank   and   file   decreases,   as   they   consolidate   authority  
within  the  military  and  build  support  from  civilian  elites.  Because  military  spending  is  
primarily  a  side  payment,  the  effect  of  regime  age  predicted  by  Conrad  et.  al.  (2013)  is  
negated   by   the  military’s   involvement   in   politics,   and   the   negative   effect   on  military  
spending  of  being  a  military  regime  is  magnified  by  regime  age.      
H5:  The  size  of  the  negative  effect  of  military  regime  will  increase  with  regime  age.        
Varieties  of  Military  Intervention  
There  are  a  variety  of  ways  and  degrees  to  which  the  military  can  involve  itself  in  
politics.   Svolik   breaks   regimes   into   four   categories   based   on   the   role   of   the  military:  
civilian,   indirect   involvement   by   the   military,   corporate   military   involvement,   and  
personalist   military   involvement.   The   latter   two   categories   are   forms   of   direct  
involvement,  and  require  that  the  leader  herself  be  a  professional  soldier,  who  came  to  
power  through  military  means  (or  was  elected  by  a  military  junta)  (Svolik  2012,  pg  33).    
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There   are   two   important   considerations   when   evaluating   the   manner   in   which  
military  involvement  affects  military  spending:  who  is  getting  paid,  and  in  what  coin?  
In   indirect   regimes,   the   leader   is   a   civilian,   but   the  military   is   involved   in  politics.   In  
such  cases,  I  assume  it  is  primarily  military  elites  whose  loyalty  is  being  purchased  who  
are  being  paid.  Because  they  are  elites,  the  leader  can  use  both  policy  concessions  and  
share  spoils.  In  indirect  military  regimes,  the  military  elites  cannot  extract  rents  directly  
from   civilian   portions   of   the   military   (though   the   military   itself   may   have   its   own  
revenue   streams).   Instead,   the   military   is   able   to   exert   some   control   over   policy.   In  
contrast,  in  a  purely  civilian  regime,  the  military  may  have  leverage  over  the  leader,  but  
it  does  not  have  influence  over  policy  making;  hence,  the  military  elites  are  reimbursed  
financially,  rather  than  politically.    
H6:  Indirect  military  regimes  will  spend  less  on  their  militaries  than  civilian  regimes.    
In  direct  military  regimes,  the  leader  is  a  professional  soldier,  who  came  to  power  
with   the   support   of   the   military.   In   personalist   military   regimes,   the   military   is   not  
institutionally   integrated   into   the   policy   apparatus.   The   top   political   posts,   including  
the  head  of  state,  are  held  by  military  elites,  but  otherwise  the  government   is  civilian.  
Military  elites,  then,  are  rewarded  directly  through  control  over  policy  and  direct  rent-­‐‑
seeking.  As  a  result,  side  payments  through  military  spending  are  unnecessary  for  elite  
buy-­‐‑in  –   they   serve  primarily  as   income   for  middle  and   lower   level   soldiers.   I   expect  
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that,   on   average,   direct,   personalist  military   control   of   the   regime  will   drive  military  
spending  down.    
H7:  Personalist  military  regimes  will  be  associated  with  lower  levels  of  military  spending.    
In   corporate   military   regimes,   the   effect   is   not   as   clear.   In   corporate   military  
regimes,   the   military   are   institutionally   integrated   into   traditional   civilian   fields   of  
governance 11 .   In   that   case,   those   government   roles   could   result   in   less   military  
spending,  because  a  significant  portion  of  the  military  is  reimbursed  in  other  ways;  or  
increased  military  spending,  because  the  military  has  taken  on  responsibilities  outside  
of  its  area.    
Table  3.1:  Hypotheses  
  
Executive  Accountability  
Jessica   Weeks   argues   that   leaders   who   are   accountable   to   elite   audiences   act  
similarly   to   leaders  who  are  accountable   to  public  audiences   (i.e.  democratic   leaders).  
She   distinguishes   between   regimes   in   which   the   leader   answers   to   an   independent  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  This  integration  can  be  achieved  in  a  variety  of  ways,  including  both  membership  in  the  legislature  and  
responsibility  for  policy  execution.    
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domestic   audience,   and   those   in   which   the   leader   does   not.   She   codes   the   latter   as  
personalist   dictatorships.   Combined   with   her   conceptualization   of   military   and   non-­‐‑
military   regimes,   this   yields   four   types   of   autocracies:   strongmen,   juntas,   bosses,   and  
machines.  Strongmen  are   leaders  with  a  military  background  who  are   surrounded  by  
military  advisors,  but  do  not  answer  to  military  elites  –  they  are  unconstrained.  Juntas  
feature  military  leaders  who  are  constrained  by  military  elites.  Bosses  are  unconstrained  
civilian   leaders,   and   machines   are   civilian   regimes   with   accountable   leaders.   Weeks  
expects   leaders   to   be   more   aggressive   internationally   when   they   cannot   be   held  
accountable  to  elites  (2012).  If  she  is  right,  personalist  dictatorships  will  spend  more  on  
their  militaries,  because  they  are  more  likely  to  use  military  power.    
H8:   Personalist   regimes   (strongmen   and   bosses)   invest   more   in   their   military   than   non-­‐‑
personalist  regimes  (juntas  and  machines).    
  
Her  argument  does  not  negate  mine,   so  as   stated   in  hypothesis  1,   I   expect   juntas  and  
strongmen  to  invest  less  in  their  military  than  do  machines  and  bosses  (respectively).    
Political  Competition  and  Institutions  
Conrad,   Kim,   and   Souva   (2013)   argue   that   political   competition   expands   the  
interests   the   leader   serves,   and   as   a   result,   decreases   military   spending.   Political  
competition   is   related   to   accountability,   but   is   often   treated   as   a   distinct   concept   and  
measure   (see  Goldsmith  2007,   for  example).   I   include  Conrad  et.   al.’s  hypothesis,  and  
expand  on  it.  Political  competition  decreases  the  ability  of  the  leader  and  ruling  elites  to  
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engage   in   exclusive   rent   seeking   and   forces   policy   compromise.  As   a   result,  military  
elites,  even  when  in  control  of  the  government,  cannot  pay  themselves  as  much  as  they  
could  in  the  absence  of  political  competition.  Political  competition  diminishes  the  effect  
of  military  regime  on  military  spending.    
H9.  Military  spending  will  be  negatively  associated  with  political  competition.    
H10.  Political  competition  reduces  the  effect  of  military  regime.  
Methodology  
Times   series  panel  data   can  exhibit  numerous  problems   to  effective  estimation.   I  
follow  Conrad,  Kim  and  Souva  (2013),  and  use  established  models  from  Fordham  and  
Walker   (2005)   and  Nordhaus,  Oneal,   and  Russett   (2012).   Both   sets   of  models   address  
temporal   autocorrelation.   Fordham   and   Walker   use   Prais-­‐‑Winsten   estimation,   while  
Nordhaus   et.   al.   use   a   two-­‐‑step   least   squares   design   that   instruments   for   the   lagged  
dependent  variable.  Because  the  models  include  different  sets  of  control  variables,  and  
different  dependent  variables  (discussed  below),  using  both  tests  the  robustness  of  my  
findings.   The   findings   below   are   robust   to   a  wide   range   of   alternative   specifications,  
including  Newey-­‐‑West  and  Driscoll-­‐‑Kraay  standard  errors.    
Measurement  of  the  Dependent  Variable    
I  use  TSCS  data  of  logged  military  expenditures  from  1950-­‐‑2000.  Military  spending  
as  a  percentage  of  GDP  is  easy  to  understand,  and  reflects  how  much  of  itself  the  state  
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dedicates  to  military  power  (Fordham  and  Walker  2005).   I  use  Fordham  and  Walker’s  
measure   of   military   spending   as   a   percentage   of   GDP   for   one   measure   of   military  
spending.  However,  absolute  changes  in  spending  are  important  –  1%  of  GDP  is  not  the  
same  everywhere.  However,  each  dollar  spent  is  also  not  equal.  There  are  diminishing  
marginal   returns   per   dollar,   so   larger   numbers   of   dollars   are   required   to   improve  
security   as   total   spending   increases.   I   use   the   natural   log   of   military   spending   to  
approximate   that   dynamic.   I   use   data   from   Nordhaus   et.   al.   (2012)12,   which   they  
construct  using  data  from  the  Correlates  of  War  project  and  SIPRI.  
  
Measurement  of  Military  Regimes  
I   use   two  measures   of   political   institutions   in   autocracies,   coded   by   Svolik   and  
Weeks.   Svolik   breaks   regimes   into   four   categories   based   on   the   role   of   the   military:  
civilian,   indirect   involvement   by   the   military,   corporate   military   involvement,   and  
personalist   military   involvement.   The   latter   two   categories   are   forms   of   direct  
involvement,  and  require  that  the  leader  herself  be  a  professional  soldier,  who  came  to  
power  through  military  means  (or  was  elected  by  a  military  junta)  (Svolik  2012,  pg  33).    
Weeks   codes   regimes   as   personalist   and   non-­‐‑personalist   and   military   and   non-­‐‑
military.  The   latter   coding   is   based  on   the  military  background  of   the   leader   and  her  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  See  their  paper  for  a  discussion  of  where  and  why  they  substitute  SIPRI  estimates  for  COW  estimates,  
and  vise  versa.    
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immediate  advisors.  Personalist  regimes  are  regimes  where  the  leader  does  not  answer  
to   an   elite   audience.   In   non-­‐‑personalist   regimes,   the   leader   can   be   removed   and  
replaced  by  a   cadre  of  political   elites.  Weeks  uses   these   two   categories   to  define   four  
types   of   autocracies:   strongmen,   juntas,   bosses,   and  machines.   Strongmen   and   bosses  
are  personalist,  while   juntas  and  machines  are  non-­‐‑personalist.   Strongmen  and   juntas  
are  military  regimes,  while  bosses  and  machines  are  civilian.    
I  use  both   sets  of  measurement   to   show   that  my   findings  are   robust   to  different  
measurements   of   military   involvement   in   governance.   While   Svolik’s   measure   is  
conceptually  closer  to  my  argument,  Weeks’  measure  provides  an  important  robustness  
check.   Weeks   measure   also   has   been   explicitly   linked   to   foreign   policy   decisions,  
making  it  well  suited  to  models  of  military  spending.    (Svolik  2012,  Weeks  2012).  Their  
measures  of  military  regime  overlap  significantly,  but  not  entirely.    
Table  3.2  
  
Control  Variables    
The  models  presented  include  control  variables  from  Fordham  and  Walker  (2005),  
Nordhaus   et.   al.   (2012),   or   Conrad   et.   al.   (2013),   but   the   findings   are   robust   to   the  
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inclusion  of  many  others.  Every  model  includes  a  measure  of  GDP,  as  well  as  variables  
that  control  for  foreign  security  environment,  a  measure  of  regime  age,  and  a  measure  
of  political  competition  (the  latter  two  based  on  Conrad  et.  al  2013).  With  each  of  these,  
the  estimated  coefficients  are  in  line  with  existing  work.    
  
Analysis  
Table   1   provides   summary   statistics   of   my   main   independent   and   dependent  
variable,  breaking  down  military  spending  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  by  each  category  of  
military  regime,  using  Svolik’s  coding.    
Table  3.3:  Military  Regime  Types  by  Svolik  
	     
The  summary  statistics  are  only  suggestive,  but  they  are  consonant  with  hypothesis  1.  
On  average,  civilian  governments  spend  considerably  more  on  their  military  than  any  
of   the   three   types  of  military   regimes.  The   same  pattern  holds   if  Weeks’  definition  of  
military  regime  is  used.    
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Table  3.4:  Regime  Type  by  Weeks  
  
Military  Involvement:  Hypotheses  1-­‐‑3  
Tables  2a  and  2b  include  tests  of  hypotheses  1,  2  and  3.  Hypothesis  1   is  tested  in  
Models  1a,  1b,  2a,  and  2b.  “A”  models  are  based  on  Fordham  and  Walker  (2005),  and  
use  military  spending  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  for  the  dependent  variable.  “B”  models  
are  based  on  Nordhaus  et.  al’s  (2012)  favored  model,  and  use  the  natural  log  of  military  
spending   as   the   dependent   variable.   The  models   each   include   Fordham   and  Walker  
(2005)  and  Nordhaus  et.  al.’s  (2012)  control  variables,  respectively,  as  well  as  the  main  
variables   of   interest   from  Conrad   et.   al.,   political   competition   and   regime   age   (2013).  
Models   1   and   2   include   measures   of   military   regime   from   Svolik   (2012)   and  Weeks  
(2012),   respectively.   Hypothesis   1   is   supported   in   all   four   specifications.   In   all   four  
models,  military  regime  has  a  negative  and  significant  effect  on  military  spending.  
Models  3  and  4  include  everything  in  Models  1  and  2  as  well  as  dummy  variables  
for  transitions  to  and  from  military  regimes.  Hypothesis  2  receives  moderate  support,  as  
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there   is   a   positive   and   statistically   significant   coefficient   on   transitions   to   a   military  
regime   in   3   of   the   4  models   (Model   3a   is   the   exception),   but   there   is   no   evidence   in  
support  of  Hypothesis  3.    
  
Regime  Age  and  Type:  Hypotheses  4  and  5  
Table   3   presents   results   from  Models   5   and   6,   a   and   b.   They   are   similar   to   the  
models  3  and  4,  with  two  differences.  Most  importantly,  regime  age  is  interacted  with  
military   regime,   allowing   a   more   dynamic   relationship   between   military   regimes  
coming   to  power  and  becoming  entrenched,  and  regime  age.  These  models  provide  a  
test  of  hypotheses  4  and  5.  The  second  difference  is  that,  because  a  measure  of  military  
regime   “newness”   is   included   implicitly   in   the   interaction   of   regime   type   and   age,   I  
excluded  the  dummy  for  transition  to  military  regime.    
Figure  1  shows  the  effect  of  regime  age  on  military  and  non-­‐‑military  regimes.  As  
Conrad  et.  al.  (2013)  predict,  regime  age  increases  military  spending  in  civilian  regimes.  
Contrary   to   their   expectation,   but   consonant   with   mine,   it   has   no   effect   in   military  
regimes.  In  civilian  autocratic  regimes,  as  the  civilian  leaders  consolidate  their  support,  
the  number  of  actors   they  have   to  answer   to  decreases.  However,   the  military  always  
remains   one   of   the   crucial   members   of   their   coalition.   As   a   result,   they   increasingly  
distribute  funds  to  the  military  as  they  age.    
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Figure  2  shows  the  estimated  effect  of  military  regime  over  regime  age  in  each  of  
the   four  models.   In  all   four,  hypothesis  5   is  supported.  The  negative  effect  of  military  
regime   increases   in  magnitude  with   regime   age.  As  military   regimes   consolidate,   the  
elites  extract  more  benefits  directly,  requiring  less  military  spending  for  side  payments.  
Figure   2   also  provides   a   secondary   test   of   hypothesis   2.  Only   in  model   5b,   using   the  
natural  log  of  military  spending  and  Svolik’s  measure  of  military  regime  intervention,  is  
there  a  statistically  significant  evidence  of  a  positive  effect  of  transitioning  to  a  military  
regime,  though.    
  
Varieties	  of	  Military	  Regimes	  and	  Executive	  Responsibility:	  Hypotheses	  6-­‐9	  
Table   4   shows   the   results   of   tests   of   hypotheses   6-­‐‑8.  The  models   are   identical   to  
models  3  and  4,  with  disaggregated  measures  of  autocratic  regime  type  instead  of   the  
dichotomous  measures  of  military  regime.  Models  7a  and  7b  test  hypotheses  6  and  7.  In  
both  models,   personalist   and   indirect   military   regime   have   negative   and   statistically  
significant   coefficients,   as   my   theory   predicts.   Corporate   military   regimes,   where  
military  spending  may  increase  to  support  the  rank  and  file  who  do  government  work  
beyond  traditional  military  responsibilities,  or  decrease  because  of  military  involvement  
in  the  government,  show  no  statistically  significant  relationship.  Models  8a  and  8b  test  
hypothesis  9,  which  predicts  that  Weeks’  definition  of  personalist  regimes  –  ones  with  
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leaders  who  do  not  answer  to  elite  audiences  –  will  spend  more  on  average  that  non-­‐‑
personalist  regimes.  
  
Table  3.5a:  Models  of  Military  Spending  as  a  Percentage  of  GDP  
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Table  3.6:  Models  of  Military  Spending  
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To   evaluate   the   claim   that   personalist   regimes   spend   more,   the   important  
comparisons   are   boss   regimes   to   machines,   and   strongman   regimes   to   juntas.   To  
evaluate  whether,   controlling   for  personalist   regime,  military   regimes   still   spend   less,  
the  relevant  comparisons  are  boss  to  strongman  and  machine  to   junta.  In  both  models  
the   order   of   effect   of   regime   type,   from   most   negative   to   most   positive,   is   junta,  
strongman,   machine,   boss.   Table   5   contains   the   p-­‐‑values   of   a   chi-­‐‑squared   test  
comparing  their  coefficients.  In  the  4  relevant  comparisons  (2  comparisons  over  2  tests),  
personalist   regimes   spend   more   than   non-­‐‑personalist   regimes   with   a   .1   level   of  
significance   (machine-­‐‑boss   is   p<.056   for   Model   7a).   Model   7b   shows   no   difference  
between   bosses   and  machines.   So   the   evidence   in   favor   of   hypothesis   9   is  mixed,   as  
personalist   regimes   appear   to   spend   more   than   non-­‐‑personalist   regimes   when   that  
regime  is  military  (strongmen  spend  more  than  juntas),  but  not  necessarily  more  when  
the   regime   is   civilian.   That   finding   fits   with   my   central   argument   that   spending  
decreases   in   military   regimes   because   members   of   the   military   can   extract   rewards  
directly,  because  in  juntas  a  larger  cadre  of  military  elites  hold  authority.    On  the  other  
hand,   breaking   the   regimes   out   into   different   types   of   military   regimes,   either   by  
Svolik’s   measure   of   military   involvement   or   Weeks’   measure   of   personalist/non-­‐‑
personalist   regimes,   does   not   diminish   the   negative   effect   of   military   regime   on  
spending.  Hypothesis  1  remains  supported.    
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Table  3.7:  Models  of  Military  Spending  
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Other  Political  Institutions  
Hypothesis   9   does   not   require   a   separate   test,   because   political   competition   is  
included  in  all  of  the  above  models.  In  each  of  them,  it  has  a  negative  and  statistically  
significant   effect.   Hypothesis   10   is   tested   by   models   9   and   10   (a   and   b),   which   are  
presented   in   table   6.   These   models   build   on   models   5   and   6,   adding   an   interaction  
between  political  competition  and  military  regime.  Figure  3  presents  the  results  of  those  
interactions.  When  political  competition  increases,  the  negative  effect  of  military  regime  
diminishes.  Interestingly,  that  effect  appears  to  take  place  even  at  relatively  low  levels  
of  political   competition  –   it   is   only   in   the   cases  of  very   low  political   competition   that  
there   is   a   statistically   significant   effect   of   military   regime.   However,   most   military  
regimes  reside  in  that  category.  While  political  competition  ranges  from  1  to  5,  there  are  
very   few   or   no   instances   of   military   regimes   with   political   competition   values   of   5.  
Accordingly,  the  graphs  only  present  the  marginal  effect  of  military  regime  for  political  
competition  for  values  ranging  from  1  to  4.    
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Table  3.9  
  





Military  spending  in  authoritarian  regimes  is  an  important  side  payment  used  by  
the  leader  to  purchase  the  support  of  the  military.  Military  involvement  in  governance  
creates  substitutes  for  military  spending  as  side  payment,  either  by  giving  military  elites  
the   ability   to   extract   rents   directly   or  make  policy.  As   a   result,   authoritarian  military  
regimes   of   all   stripes   spend   less   on   average   on   their   military   than   do   civilian  
authoritarian  regimes.  This  finding  has  important  implications  for  academic  scholarship  
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on   this   topic   and   related   policy   questions.   It   shows   that   not   all  military   spending   is  
created  equal.  Literature   that   treats  military  spending  as  equivalent  across  states  with  
regards  to  conflict  is  mistaken  –  much  of  the  military  spending  in  autocratic  regimes  is  
not   intended   for   the   creation   of  military   power.   Second,   it   shows   that   the  manner   in  
which   leaders   reward   their   supporters   varies,   and   it   is   not   sufficient   to   argue   that   a  
military   leader   will   reward   military   supporters   and   a   civilian   will   reward   civilian  
supporters.  Arguments   about  how   leaders   reward   their   constituents  need   to   consider  
the  variety  of  ways   those  constituents   can  be   rewarded,  and  what   involvement   in   (or  
exclusion   from)  politics  means   for   those   rewards.   It  may  be   true   that  military   leaders  
depend  more  on  members  of   the  military   for   support   than   civilian   leaders.  This  does  
not  imply  that  they  will  budget  more  for  the  military,  however.  The  evidence  revealed  
in   this   paper   shows   that   it   is,   in   fact,   the   opposite.   Perhaps   counter   intuitively,   but  
sensibly  in  light  of  my  argument,  military  participation  in  government  reduces  military  
spending.  This  finding  similarly  casts  doubt  on  naïve  versions  of  the  bureaucratic  “you  
stand  where  you  sit”  argument.  
For   policy-­‐‑makers,   my   findings   suggest   that   military   spending   in   autocratic  
regimes  should  not  be  necessarily  seen  as   indicating  foreign  aggressiveness.  Rather,   it  
may  reflect  domestic  shifts  in  power  within  the  state.  The  desirability  of  those  shifts  will  
depend  on  the  observer  –  I  make  no  claims  about  the  relative  superiority  of  civilian  or  
military   autocracies,   but   the   assessment   of   their   meaning   should   be   made   with   the  
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knowledge  that  military  spending  functions  significantly,  perhaps  even  primarily,  as  a  
side   payment   in   autocratic   regimes.   Further,   these   findings   ought   to   assist   policy-­‐‑
makers   in   predicting   the   likely   outcome   of   certain   types   of   regime   changes.   For  
example,   military   stewardship   as   part   of   a   planned   (though   often   not   fulfilled)  
transition  to  democracy  may  be  associated  with  a  drop  in  military  spending.  That  does  
not  mean,  however,  that  the  military  elites  in  charge  of  governance  are  not  lining  their  
pockets.    
Finally,  this  article  calls  attention  to  how  much  work  remains  to  be  done  on  both  
military   spending   and   autocratic   variation.  Military   spending   serves  many   purposes,  
and   varies   in   purpose   across   contexts.   Autocracies   vary   widely   in   their   institutional  
make-­‐‑up   and   security   environment.   I   address   political   competition   and   executive  
accountability,   leaving   the   role   of   institutions   like   legislatures,   political   parties,   or  
independent  courts  for  later  work.  The  importance  of  the  military  to  domestic  security  
will  vary  across  contexts,  with  active  police  and  other  security  organizations  providing  
some,  but  not  all,  domestic  control.  Those  variations,  too,  will  affect  how  militaries  are  
funded,   both   in   amount   and   in  kind   (what   they   spend   it   on).  There   is  much  on  both  
topics   left   to   explore,   and   studies   of  military   spending   can   provide   a   useful  window  
into  policy  making  across  regime  types.    
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Chapter  4:  The  Foreign  Origins  of  Military  Spending:  




I   use   a   spatial   lag   and   error   model   to   examine   three   possible   pathways   of  
interdependence   between   military   budgets:   probability   of   conflict,   rivalry,   and  
alliances.   I   show   that   military   budgets   affect   each   other   spatially   through   conflict  
probability   and   military   alliances.   States   arm   competitively   when   the   likelihood   of  
conflict   is   high.  Allies,   on   the   other   hand,   treat  military   spending   by   their   allies   as   a  
substitute  for  military  spending  on  their  own.  However,  allies   increase  their  spending  
in  response  to  increases  in  their  allies’  likelihood  of  conflict.  With  two  sets  of  models,  I  
also  show  that  modeling  these  processes  separately  can  lead  to  false  positive  results,  as  
rivalry   creates   statistically   significant   interdependence   only   when   the   likelihood   of  
conflict  is  excluded  from  the  analysis.    
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How   does   the   military   spending   of   one   state   affect   the   military   spending   of  
another?   I   examine   how   alliances   and   threat   influence  military   spending   in   order   to  
better  understand  why  states   invest   the  amounts   they  do   in   their  militaries,   and  how  
the   state   policies   are   interdependent.   I   use   a   spatial   lag   and   error  model   to   examine  
three   possible   pathways   of   interdependence   between  military   budgets:   probability   of  
conflict,  rivalry,  and  alliances.  
The   empirical   literature   on   interdependence   between   state   foreign   policies   and  
military   spending   is   lengthy.   Early   work   focused   on   a   small   number   of   states,  
particularly  superpower  rivalries,  and  used  a  variety  of  methodological  techniques.  The  
most   sophisticated   of   them   found   dependencies   between   the   budgets   and   crisis  
behavior   of   competing   states   (e.g.   Freeman  1983),   but   rarely,   if   ever,  dealt  with  more  
than  three  actors.    Some  recent  work  has  begun  to  include  spatial  lag  techniques.  Flores  
finds   that   a   state’s   military   spending   is   positively   correlated   with   its   allies’   military  
spending   (Flores   2011).  Goldsmith   also  uses   a   spatial   lag  model,   and   finds   a  positive  
correlation  between  a  state’s  military  spending  and  its  neighbors,  as  well  as  a  regional  
effect   on   spending   (Goldsmith   2007).   I   build   on,   and   in   some   cases,   contradict,   those  
investigations.    
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Competitive  Arming:  Foreign  Threat  and  the  Security  Dilemma  
In  the  classic  theoretical  literature  (Waltz  1979,  Walt  1990)  and  work  on  arms  races  
(Richardson   1960,   Glaser   2000,   Morrow   1993),   military   spending   is   considered   a  
response  to  foreign  threats.  Recent  empirical  work  supports  that  contention  (Nordhaus  
et.  al.  2012,  Goldsmith  2003,  Dunne  et.  al.  2007,  Rosh  1988).  A  useful  starting  point  for  
understanding   threat   and   military   buildups   is   the   security   dilemma.   The   security  
dilemma  describes  a  situation  where  security  is  relative  and  competitive.  The  idea  was  
first   proposed   in   modern   scholarship   by   Herz,   and   is   a   distillation   of   ideas   from  
Hobbes,  Rousseau  and  others  (Herz  1950,  Wagner  2007).  Herz,  and  later  scholars  such  
as  Walt  and  Wendt,  also  identify  important  ways  in  which  the  severity  of  the  security  
dilemma  can  vary  between  pairs  of  actors.  The  security  dilemma  is  described  by  Herz:  
Groups  or  individuals  living  in  such  a  constellation  must  be,  and  usually  
are,   concerned   about   their   security   from   being   attacked,   subjected,  
dominated,   or   annihilated   by   other   groups   and   individuals.   Striving   to  
attain  security  from  such  attack,  they  are  driven  to  acquire  more  and  more  
power  in  order  to  escape  the  impact  of  the  power  of  others.  This,  in  turn,  
renders   the   others   more   insecure   and   compels   them   to   prepare   for   the  
worst.   Since   none   can   ever   feel   entirely   secure   in   such   a   world   of  
competing   units,   power   competition   ensues,   and   the   vicious   circle   of  
security  and  power  accumulation  is  on  (Herz  1950).    
  
The   dominance   of   the   security   dilemma   as   the   defining   characteristic   of   the  
international  system  varies  across  different  schools  of  thought  in  international  relations  
theory.   “Realists”  argue   that   international  anarchy  means   that  all   states  are   subject   to  
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the  security  dilemma,  and  that  therefore  relative  capabilities  are  the  foremost  concern  of  
states   foreign   policy.   Within   the   realist   paradigm,   there   is   ample   variation,   with  
Mearshimer  (2001)  arguing  that  all  great  powers  must  therefore  be  power  maximizers,  
and   Walt   (1990)   amending   the   concerns   of   states   to   include   perceived   intentions.  
“Liberals”  generally  believe  that  the  security  dilemma,  while  it  exists,  is  not  the  defining  
characteristic   of   international   relations.   They   are   therefore  more   optimistic   about   the  
possibility   of   cooperation.   Between   those   two   paradigms   exists   a   wide   swath   of  
assumptions,  beliefs,  and  arguments  about  the  severity  of  the  security  dilemma.  Jervis,  
following  Herz,   discusses   how   cooperation   is   even  with   the   security   dilemma   (Jervis  
1978).  Wagner   argues   that   the   security   dilemma   is   not,   itself,   sufficient   for  war,   and  
points   to  work   by   Fearon   and   Powell   that   explores   competitive   security   through   the  
related  concept  of  the  commitment  problem  (Wagner  2007).  In  perhaps  the  most  broad-­‐‑
based  argument  about  the  role  of  the  security  dilemma  in  international  politics,  Wendt  
argues  that  the  relationship  between  states  is  a  product  of  the  interaction  of  those  states,  
their   perception   of   each   other,   and   their   beliefs   about   the   nature   of   the   international  
system  (1986).    
Pairs  of  states  may  regard  each  other  as  threatening,  and  therefore  find  themselves  
in   a   security   dilemma,   but   they   may   also   view   each   other   as   friendly   and   non-­‐‑
competitive   (at   least   in   the  realm  of  security).  The   literature   that  most  directly   tackles  
the   question   of   why   some   states   are   more   acrimonious   than   others   is   the   enduring  
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rivalry   literature   (Colaresi   et.   al.   2008,   Thompson   2001,   Goertz   and   Diehl   2000).  
Enduring  or  strategic  rivals  view  each  other  as  geopolitical  competitors.    
Arms   races   do   not   necessarily   emerge   wherever   there   is   a   security   dilemma.  
Rather,   the  security  dilemma  is  a  necessary  condition   for  arms  races.  States  can  act   to  
mitigate   the   security   dilemma   through   international   agreements   or   institutions.   They  
can  choose  other  options  for  increasing  their  security.  They  may  choose  to  settle  for  the  
status  quo  rather  than  continuously  ratcheting  up  military  spending.  However,  in  each  
of  those  scenarios,  the  amount  spent  by  one  state  still  depends  on  the  amount  spent  by  
the  other  state.  Put  another  way,  if  there  is  a  security  dilemma  between  states,  military  
spending   between   states   is   interdependent.      Their   spending   will   move   together.  
Dramatic,  simultaneous  increases,  or  arms  races,  are  a  subset  of  that.    
  
Alliances  and  Arming  
Alliances  aggregate   the  capabilities  of   their  participants,  often  against  a  common  
threat.  Waltz   referred   to   that  process   as   external  balancing,  which  he   contrasted  with  
internal   balancing.   Existing   work   on   alliances   often   asserts   that   arms   and   allies   are  
substitutes,  but  rarely  tests  that  contention.  More  often,  work  on  alliances  focuses  on  a  
particular   kind   of   substitution,   free-­‐‑riding.   I   make   no   effort   to   distinguish   between  
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substitution  that  creates  efficiencies,  and  substitution  that  results  in  the  under-­‐‑provision  
of  security.  
Interestingly,  some  investigations  of  alliances  and  arming  even  find  that  alliances  
increase   spending   across   allies   (e.g.   Flores   2011).   I   argue   that   this   is   because   they  
inadequately  control  for  threat,  and  do  not  directly  model  the  interdependence  created  
by   alliances   between   states’   military   budgets.   Allies’   spending   will   often   increase  
together,  but  in  response  to  omitted  variables  such  as  shared  threat.    
  
Theory  
Foreign  Threats  and  Competitive  Arming  
Countries  engage   in   two  types  of  competitive  arming.  Most  directly,  competitive  
arming  is  a  result  of  the  specter  of  armed  conflict  between  the  states.  Potential  conflict  
creates  a  security  dilemma.  Spending   in  state   i  makes  state   j   less   safe,  and  vice  versa.  
That   leads   each   state   to   increase   spending   when   the   other   does,   because   if   conflict  
occurs,   neither   wishes   to   be   at   a   disadvantage.   Dependence   between   the   military  
budgets   of   two   states   is   a   product   of   the   likelihood   of   conflict   between   them.  As   the  
probability   of   conflict   increases,   the   effect   of   state   j’s   military   spending   on   state   i’s  
security  increases.  As  conflict  grows  more  likely,  so  does  the  dependence  between  the  
states.    
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H1.   Positive   interdependence   between   military   budgets   will   correspond   to   the  
likelihood  of  conflict  between  states.    
  
States  may   also   engage   in   competitive   arming   independent   of   the   likelihood   of  
conflict.  Arming  can  be  a  form  of  signaling  or  non-­‐‑violent  competition.  It  is  a  way  two  
states  may  engage   in  a  game  of  attrition,  without  engaging   in   the  actual  use  of   force.  
Arming  in  this  manner  is  a  result  of  a  particular  type  of  security  dilemma,  where  states  
consider  their  power  relative  to  one  another,  independent  of  the  probability  of  conflict.  
Strategic   rivals   will   be   particularly   prone   to   this   kind   of   arming.   Rivals   regard   each  
other   as   competitors.   They   emphasize   relative   gains  more   than   other   dyads.  Arming  
between  rivals  is  more  than  preparation  for  armed  conflict,  though  it  is  that  as  well.  It  is  
a  competition  in  of  itself.  Rivalry  creates  dependence  between  states  beyond  its  effect  on  
conflict  likelihood.    
H2.  Strategic  rivalry  causes  positive  interdependence  between  state  military  budgets.  
  
Alliances  and  Arming  Substitution  
States  can  contract  for  security  through  military  alliances  (Morrow  1991,  Olsen  and  
Zeckhauser  1966,  Poast  et.  al.  2014).  Alliances  aggregate  capabilities  and  threat.  When  
state   i   and   state   j   form   an   alliance,   they   agree   to   come   to   each   other’s   defense   (often  
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under   particular   circumstances) 13 .   This   leads   to   multiple   paths   of   contagion   and  
substitution.    
Arming  and  alliances  are  substitutes  (Morrow  1993).  Alliances  are  formed  because  
at  least  one  state  cannot  or  prefers  not  to  increase  their  military  spending  to  meet  their  
security  needs.  When  both  (or  all)  allies  have  a  common  enemy,  this  can  lead  to  more  
efficient  spending.  Consider  a  simple  scenario,  with  three  states,  A,  B,  and  their  threat,  
T.   If   X   dollars   are   required   to   balance   against   T,   and   A   and   B   have   to   do   so  
independently;   each   spends   X,   leading   to   2X   in   military   spending.   If   they   ally   and  
combine   their   resources,   neither   needs   to   spend   the   full   X   amount.   Some   amount  
between  X   and   2X   is   spent   between   them,   leading   to   a  more   efficient   distribution   of  
resources.  Resources  devoted  to  defense  by  A  reduce  the  quantity  B  needs  to  devote  to  
defense,   and   vice   versa.   An   alliance   creates   negative   interdependence   (substitution)  
between  state  military  budgets.  
H3:   Alliances   will   be   associated   with   negative   interdependence   between   military  
budgets.    
  
Alliances  where  there  is  not  a  common  threat  also  create  negative  interdependence  
between  military  budgets.  To  amend  the  above  scenario,  consider  if  B  is  threatened  by  T  
but  A   is   not.   State  A’s   spending,   if   A   and   B   have   an   alliance,   still   contributes   to   B’s  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  This   is   a   simplification,   as   alliances   serve   different   purposes,   and   often   more   than   one   purpose.  
However,   virtually   all   those   purposes   include   a   component   of   arming   substitution   and   exchange.   For  
example,   offensive   alliances   are   similar   to  defensive   ones,  with   a  different   focus.   They   feature   a   target  
opponent,  and  while  the  goal  is  not  to  deter  that  opponent,  but  rather  to  conquer  or  coerce,  less  spending  
is  required  on  the  part  of  each  than  it  would  were  they  individually  to  pursue  the  same  aims.    
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security.   Similarly,  A  does   not   need   to   spend   as  much   to  provide   security   for  B,   if   B  
spends  more.  However,  A  does   have   to   spend  more   than   it  would  were   it   not   in   an  
alliance,  because  now  it  is  concerned  with  the  threat  to  B,  as  well  as  to  itself.  It  spends  in  
respond   to   T,  where   otherwise   it  would   not.  When   only   one   state   has   a   threat   in   an  
alliance,  the  other  state  acquires  some  of  that  threat  through  the  alliance.  Accordingly,  
alliances  introduce  a  positive  dependence  between  a  state  and  threats  to  its  allies.    
H4:  States  will  increase  their  spending  in  response  to  increases  in  threat  to  their  allies.    
  
Research  Approach  
I   use   time   series   cross   sectional   data   of   state   military   spending,   state  
characteristics,  and  dyadic  relationships  between  the  states  to  evaluate  hypotheses  1-­‐‑4.  
Dyadic   relationships   between   states   (pathways   of   possible   interdependence)   are  
grouped  in  matrices  called  W  matrices.  Each  W  matrix  describes  one  set  of  connections.  
For  example,   the  W  matrix  of  alliances   is  an  NTxNT  matrix  with  a  1  where  two  cases  
share  a  military  alliance,  and  a  0  otherwise.    
  
Spatial  Relationships  and  Interdependence  
Theories   about   the   strategic   relations   between   states   necessitate   the   treatment   of  
states   as   interdependent   actors.      The   actions   of   one   state   often   affect   the   actions   of  
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another   state.     This   is  particularly   true   in   the   field  of   security   studies,  which   includes  
the  prominent   concepts  of   arming  and  allying.  Empirical   evaluations  of   such   theories  
should  therefore  incorporate  this  interdependence  into  their  statistical  models.    This  can  
be   achieved   in   two  ways.  One   is   by   treating   relationships   as   the   unit   of   observation.  
Dyadic  analysis   is   the  most   common  example  of   this   (though  most   analysis   still  does  
not  account  for  interdependence  between  related  dyads)  (Neumayer  2010).  The  second  
way  is  by  modeling  the  interdependence  directly  in  the  statistical  model,  as  advocated  
by  Franzese  and  Hays  and  others.  (Franzese  and  Hays  2007,  2008)  
The  use  of   spatial  models   in  political   science  has  ballooned   in   recent  years,  with  
good  cause.    Many  phenomena  of  interest,  across  virtually  all  fields  of  political  science,  
involve  some  type  of  interdependence  between  the  units  of  analysis.  The  use  of  spatial  
to   describe   this   interdependence   is   convenient,   and   in   many   cases   distance   or  
geography  is  a  relevant  source  of  interdependence,  but  it  should  not  be  taken  to  mean  
that   all   interdependence   is   a   result   of   proximity   in   space.      There   are   many   ways   in  
which   units   in   a   model   can   be   linked   in   a   manner   that   impacts   the   outcome   being  
studied,   whatever   it   may   be.   The   appropriate   method   for   modeling   such  
interdependence  is  spatial  regression.  
Models   that   fail   to   specify   interdependence  when   it   is   present   risk   inflating   the  
estimated   coefficients   on   unit   level   variables.      Variables   that   correlate   with   the   true  
terms  of  connectivity  are  typically  the  most  inflated.    To  the  extent  that  one  portion  of  
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the   model   is   misspecified,   typically   leading   to   coefficients   that   underestimate   the  
magnitude  of  the  relationship,  the  coefficients  for  other  portions  will  be  overestimated.    
The  exclusion  or  poor  specification  of  one  portion  of  a  data-­‐‑generating  process   (often,  
but   not   always,   the   interdependence),   introduces,   in   essence,   omitted   variable   bias,  
which  can  lead  to  poor  estimations  (  exaggerated  typically)    for  even  the  well-­‐‑specified  
portion  of  the  model.      
Models  of  interdependence  face  a  number  of  methodological  challenges,  including  
Galton’s   problem   and   simultaneity   bias.      Galton’s   problem   refers   to   the   difficulty   of  
distinguishing  between  common  shocks  (or  other  mechanisms  that  can  affect  a  group  of  
units  similarly)  and  true  interdependence.    As  with  other  difficulties,  misspecification  in  
either   the   common   shock   or   interdependence   portion   of   the   model   exacerbates   this  
problem.   Simultaneity   bias14   is   a   result   of   endogenity   between   the   y   variables   –  
specifically,  if  yi  is  dependent  on  yj  and  yj  is  dependent  on  yi,  then,  in  the  case  of  positive  
interdependence,   the   estimated   coefficient   on  W  may   be   inflated15.   This   can,   in   turn,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Kays,  Kachi,  and  Franzese  (2010)  state  that  the  inclusion  of  only  a  time-­‐‑lagged  spatial  lag  removes  the  
simultaneity  bias   that  exists   in  estimation  with  spatial  OLS  rather   that  ML.     However,  as   they  go  on  to  
argue,  that  particular  scenario  does  not  seem  to  reflect  the  reality  of  many  social  phenomena,  especially  
given  the  large  units  of  time  typical  for  TSCS  data  at  the  international  level.      
15  In  situations  of  negative  interdependence  this  may  be  reversed.  In  both  cases,  the  effect  of  inflation  or  
deflation  on  other  portions  of  the  model  also  depends  on  the  direction  of  the  correlation.      
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lead  to  the  coefficients  on  unit  level  variables  being  underestimated,  particularly  those  
variables  positively  correlated  with  variables  of  interdependence16.  
A   generic   spatial-­‐‑autoregressive   model   with   spatial-­‐‑autoregression   in   the  
disturbances  can  be  written17:   ! =   λ!!+ !"+ !  !   =   ρ!"+   ε  
The   above   includes   unit-­‐‑level   explanatory   variables   X,   with   coefficients  ! .     
represents  NT  observations  with  k  independent  variables  (presumed  exogenous)  and     
is   their   corresponding   k   x   1   and   vector   of   coefficients.   The   dependent   variable   is  
represented  by  the  NT  x  1  vector  y.  Wy  defines  the  spatial  lag,  with  the  NT  x  NT  matrix  
W  as  a  spatial  weighting  matrix  that  defines  the  relative  weights  of  connection  between  
one  unit  in  y  with  the  other  units  in  y.  W  describes  the  relationship  between  the  units,  
with  λ  the  coefficient  on  Wy18.  M  is  often  identical  to  W,  and  describes  the  relationship  
between   the   disturbances.   In   a   model   without   spatial   autoregressive   disturbances,  !   =   ε.  ε  is   an   NT   x   1   stochastic   term   and   is   frequently   assumed   to   be   i.i.d.   In   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  In   time  series  cross-­‐‑sectional  data,  a   time   lag  can   introduce  one  further  complication.  Specifically,   the  
first  period   (however  defined)   is   treated  as   fixed,  and   the   rest  of   the  estimation   is   conditional  on   the  y  
value  of  that  first  period.  In  low  t  contexts  that  can  lead  to  biased  results.    However,  that  bias  shrinks  as  
the  number  of  time  periods  expands.  
17  I  follow  Drukker  et.  al.  (2013)  notationally,  but  an  identical  model  could  be  written  differently  (see,  for  
example,  Franzese  and  Hays  2007  and  2008).    
18  λ!!  can  be  rewritten  as   ! wijyjt! .  Note  that  wij  denotes  the  connections  between  the  observations,  
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estimated   models   below,   I   assume   the   innovations   are   independent   but  
heterosketastically  distributed.    
  
Data  
Dependent  Variable:  Military  Spending  
I  use  TSCS  data  of  logged  military  expenditures  from  1952-­‐‑1999.  I  use  the  natural  
log  of  military  spending  in  lieu  of  military  spending  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  because  of  
the  enormous  variation  in  the  size  of  states.  1%  of  a  small  state’s  GDP  cannot  substitute  
for  1%  of  a  large  state’s  GDP  in  an  alliance.  I  get  my  data  from  Nordhaus  et.  al.’s  article  
on  relationship  between   threat  environment  and  military  spending   (2012).  They  use  a  
combination  of  data  available  from  the  Correlates  of  War  project  and  SIPRI19.  
  
W  Matrices  
I  construct  three  matrices  describing  possible  lines  of  dependence  between  states.  
These  matrices  of  connectivity,  or  W  matrices,  correspond  to  hypotheses  1-­‐‑3.  The  first  is  
a  predicted  probability  that  a  fatal  MID  will  occur  between  states  i  and  j  that  year.  The  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  See  their  paper  for  a  discussion  of  where  and  why  they  substitute  SIPRI  estimates  for  COW  estimates,  
and  vice  versa.    
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second  is  whether  i  and  j  are  strategic  rivals.  The  third  is  whether  i  and  j  are  members  of  
a  formal  alliance  together.    
  
Row  Normalization  
Row  normalization  makes  interpreting  coefficients  easier,  but  makes  assumptions  
about   how   states   respond   to   threats.   With   row   normalization,   adding   an   additional  
rival  will   only   lead   to   an   increase   in   threat   experienced   by   the   state   if   the   new   rival  
spends  more  on  its  military  than  the  previous  rival(s).  A  row  normalized  W  measures  
the   relative   importance   of   each   other   state   as   a   source   of   contagion,   but   not   the   net  
exposure   to  contagion.   I  do  not  normalize  my  W  matrices,   in  order   to  account   for  net  
exposure  as  well  as  the  relative  influence  of  each  yj.  
  
Predicted  Probability  of  Fatal  MIDs  
I  used  a   logit  model   to  generate  predicted  probability  !  of   a   fatal  mid  between   i  
and   j   for   each   year,   based   loosely   on   Hegre,   Oneal   and   Russett   (2010)20.   To   avoid  
predicting   military   spending   with   military   spending,   I   used   GDP   in   lieu   of   COW  
material  capabilities  scores  or  military  spending  as  a  measure  of  power.  I  also  included  
distance   between   states   and   contiguity,   polity   scores   for   each   state   (Marshall   et.   al.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  I  used  their  replication  data,  but  simplified  the  model  considerably.    
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2009),  alliance  portfolio  similarity   (Signorino  and  Ritter  1999),   the  natural   log  of   trade  
between  states,  the  presence  of  preferential  trade  agreements,  year  dummies,  and  a  one  
year  lag  of  the  dependent  variable.  Because  I  want  to  distinguish  between  the  effect  of  
rivalry  and  of  conflict,  I  excluded  strategic  rivalry  from  my  measure.  Similarly,  while  I  
included  Signorino  and  Ritter’s  measure  of  alliance  portfolio  similarity  (1999)  (as  Hegre  
et.   al.   does),   I   did   not   include   whether   or   not   the   two   states   are   allies.   All   of   the  
variables   used   are   knowable   by   the   participant   states,   so  !  can   be   thought   of   as   an  
estimate  of  states’  belief  about  the  likelihood  of  conflict.  
  
Strategic  Rivals  
I   use   Colaresi   et.   al.’s   measure   of   strategic   rivalries   (Colaresi   et.   al.   2008).   They  
examine  diplomatic  histories  to  determine  which  states  mutually  viewed  each  other  as  
rivals.  Many  other  measures  of  rivalry  are  available,  but  most  rely  on  some  measure  of  
conflict  history.  Colaresi  et.  al.’s  focus  on  the  perceived  competition  between  the  states  
is   a   better   fit   for  my   conception   of   perceived   threat,   particularly   as   a   complement   to  
likelihood   of   conflict.   With   the   likelihood   of   conflict   included,   the   strategic   rivals  
measure  captures  the  effect  of  a  rivals  spending,  controlling  for  probability  of  conflict.  
That  allows  me  to  distinguish  between  arming  due  to  non-­‐‑violent  strategic  competition  
and  arming  driven  by  the  expectation  of  fighting.    
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Military  Alliances  
   I  use  ATOPs  data  on  military  alliances  to  build  this  matrix  (Leeds  et.  al.  2002).  I  
use  all  alliances,  not   just  dyadic  ones,  but  because  my  unit  of  analysis  is  country  year,  
each  connection   is  dyadic.   In  a  dyadic  analysis,  breaking  multilateral  agreements   into  
dyadic   agreements   would   lead   to   biased   estimates   (Poast   2010).   In   this   case,   using  
multilateral  agreements  assumes  that  the  substitution  effect  between  states  is  the  same  
in  multilateral   and  dyadic   agreements21.   Because   I   do  not   row  normalize,  Wy   strictly  
increases  as  the  number  of  allies  increase.    
  
Construction  of  Spatial  Lags  and  Instruments  
I  use  the  spmat  function  in  the  sppack  stata  package  to  create  spatial  lag  variables  
with  each  of  the  W  matrices.  I  generate  two  types  of  lags:  spatial  lags  of  y,  Wy,  and  
spatial  lags  of  RHS  variables,  x,  Wx.  I  use  the  Wys  in  models  4-­‐‑6.  I  use  one  Wx,  the  
spatial  lag  of  ally  likelihood  of  conflict  (from  Nordhaus  et  al.  2012),  to  test  hypothesis  4.  
The  Wx  variables  are  instruments  for  the  Wys  in  models  4-­‐‑6.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Though  I  do  not  evaluate  them  here,  one  can  imagine  a  variety  of  alternative  possible  specifications  that  
fit  with  the  general  argument  of  substitution,  but  designate  more  complicated  alliance  relationships.  For  
example,  rather   than  a  W  contiguity  matrix,  populated  by  0s  and  1s,  with  1s  being  an  alliance  between  
states,  one  could  design  a  matrix  that  divides  the  distance  measure  by  the  number  of  allies  in  that  alliance  
(i.e.  a  dyadic  alliance  would  yield  a  score  of  .5,  and  triadic  alliance  .33,  and  so  forth).  That  would  suggest  
that  while  there   is  a  substitution  effect,  each  ally  added  to  the  alliance  also  waters  down  the  benefit   (in  
capabilities)  received  by  state  i.    
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Unit-­‐‑Level  Control  Variables  
I  use  a  variable  generated  by  Nordhaus  et.   al.   as   a  unit-­‐‑level  measure  of   foreign  
threat  (2012).  They  estimate  the  aggregated  likelihood  of  conflict,  given  what  the  state  
knows   at   the   time.   The   result   is   a  measure   of   threat   environment   based   on   expected  
likelihood  of  conflict22.  The  model  they  use  is  similar  but  not  identical  to  the  one  I  use  to  
generate  phat  for  the  likelihood  of  conflict  matrix.  Following  Von  Hagen-­‐‑Jamar  (Paper  
1),  I  use  Boix  et.  al.’s  recently  dichotomous  coding  of  democracy  (Boix  et.  al.  2012).  They  
evaluate  countries  based  on  their  suffrage  and  political  competition,  coding  states  with  
high  levels  of  both  as  democracies,  and  the  remainder  as  non-­‐‑democracies.  I  include  the  
natural   log   of   real   GDP23  to   control   for   available   resources.   I   follow   Fordham   and  
Walker  (2005)  and  include  variables  that  count  battle  deaths  as  a  percentage  of  pre-­‐‑war  
population   for   interstate   and   intrastate   wars;   this   controls   for   wartime   spending.  
Finally,  I  include  a  lag  of  the  dependent  variable,  to  account  for  temporal  dependence24.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22Nordhaus  et.  al.  argue  that  the  ex  ante  quality  of  their  measure  alleviates  concerns  about  endogeniety  
between  military  spending  and  the  likelihood  of  war.  In  models  where  I  additionally  instrument  for  their  
measure,  or  leave  it  out  entirely,  I  do  not  find  results  that  are  substantively  different  than  those  presented  
below.    
23  I   again   use  Nordhaus   et.   al.’s   data   (2012),   and   refer   the   reader   to   their   article   for   a   discussion   of   its  
construction.      
24  In  models  1-­‐‑3  I  mimic  Nordhaus  et.  al’s  technique  and  instrument  for  the  lagged  term  using  lags  of  
GDP  and  the  likelihood  of  conflict.  In  models  4-­‐‑6,  however,  I  include  the  variable  as  is,  and  focus  on  
instrumenting  the  spatial  lags.    
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Estimation  
There  are  four  common  estimation  strategies  that  are  relevant  to  estimating  spatial  
lag  models:    OLS,  Spatial  OLS  (S-­‐‑OLS),  Spatial  2SLS,  and  Spatial  Maximum  Likelihood.    
OLS  suffers  from  (potentially  severe)  omitted  variable  bias.    Nevertheless,  it  remains  the  
most   typical   approach   in  political   science   for   estimating  models,   including   those   that  
purport  to  be  about  interdependent  systems.    Spatial  OLS  specifies  the  interdependence  
theorized  (and  so  is  an  improvement  over  OLS),  but  it  suffers  from  the  aforementioned  
simultaneity  bias.    Spatial  maximum  likelihood  estimation  is  less  prone  to  simultaneity  
bias  and  outperformed  OLS  based  spatial  regression  in  simulations  (Franzese  and  Hays  
2007,  2008).  Spatial  2SLS  deals  explicitly  with  that  simultaneity  bias  by  using  exogenous  
covariates  in  the  model  as  instruments  in  order  to  resolve  the  endogeniety  between  the  
vector  y  on  the  right  side  and  on  the  left  side.      
I  use  a  spatial  two-­‐‑step  least  squares  approach,  estimated  using  the  stata  function  
spivreg   from   the   package   sppack   to   estimate   6  models   (Drukker   et.   al.   2013).   The   first  
three   address   hypotheses   1-­‐‑3   in   turn.  Models   4-­‐‑6   each   evaluate   hypotheses   1-­‐‑3,  with  
minor   changes   in  model   specification.  All   of   the  models   test   hypothesis   4.   Spivreg   is  
designed  estimate  spatial  2sls  models  with  additional  endogenous  variables.  It  accepts  
one   W   matrix   for   the   dependent   variable,   and   allows   spatial   autoregression   in   the  
disturbances   as   well.   Including   the   possibility   of   spatial   error   helps   to   distinguish  
between  shocks  that  are  jointly  experienced  by  connected  states  and  actual  dependence  
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between   yi  and   yj.   In   each   of   the   models,   I   use   the   same  W   matrix   for   both   spatial  
processes.  In  models  4-­‐‑6,  I  include  spatial  lags  generated  using  spmat,  and  instrument  
them  using  the  corresponding  Wxs25.  Therefore,  each  model  contains  all  three  pathways  
of  interdependence,  but  because  my  instrumentation  is  slightly  different  than  that  done  
by   spivreg,   and   each  only  has   spatial   autoregression   in   the  disturbances   along  one  W  
matrix,  there  are  small  variations  in  the  estimates  each  model  produces.  In  all  models,  I  
allow  for  heterogeneity  in  the  disturbances.    
  
Results  
Table  1  shows  the  estimates  for  models  1  through  3.  Note  that  coefficients  do  not  
equate   to   full  effects,  because  y   is  determined  simultaneously.  However,   the  direction  
and   significance   of   the   coefficients   remain  meaningful.  Note   also   that   because   the  W  
matrices   are  not   row  standardized,   the   spatial  variables   are  not  on   the   same   scale,   so  
their  coefficients  are  not  directly  comparable.    
Model  1  uses  the  likelihood  of  conflict  as  the  spatial  variable.  The  coefficient  on  it  
is   positive   and   significant,   supporting   hypothesis   1.   It   also   features   a   positive   and  
significant   spatial   relationship   in   the  disturbances.  Nordhaus  et.   al.’s   (2012)  unit   level  
measure   of   threat   environment   is   also   positive   and   significant.   Hypothesis   4   is   not  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  I  exclude  W*pr(conflict),  because  I  use  the  spatially  lagged  probability  of  conflict,  with  the  alliance  W,  
as  a  RHS  variable  in  the  model.  I  also  exclude  the  W*lagged  DV.    
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supported,   as   there   is   a   positive   but   insignificant   coefficient   on   allies’   likelihood   of  
conflict  (from  the  Nordhaus  et.  al.  2012  measure).  Model  2  uses  strategic  rivalry  as  the  
spatial  variable  (Colaresi  et.  al.  2008).  As  in  model  1,  the  spatial  variable  is  positive  and  
significant   in   both   the   spatial   lag   and   error   coefficients.   Hypothesis   4   is   again  
unsupported.  Model  3  uses  military  alliances  as  the  spatial  variable  to  test  hypothesis  3.  
The   coefficient   is,   as   hypothesis   3   predicts,   negative   and   statistically   significant.  
Hypothesis   4   finds  weak   statistical   support   (significance   level  p<.1).   Interestingly,   the  
coefficient   on   the   spatial   error   is  positive   and   statistically   significant,   suggesting   that,  
while  allies  have  negative  interdependence  in  their  military  spending,  they  are  subject  
to  common  disturbances.  That  may  explain  why  previous  work  has  found  ally  military  
spending  to  be  positively  correlated.    
Models  1-­‐‑3  all   find  support   for   their  respective  hypotheses,  suggesting  that   there  
may  be  multiple  pathways  of  interdependence  between  states.  Unfortunately,  that  also  
means  all  3  models  suffer  from  omitted  variable  bias  of  unknown  severity  or  direction.  
If   networks   of   rivals   and   likely   conflict   participants   overlap   (and   they   do),   a   false  
positive  on  either  of  those  spatial  lags  could  result  from  excluding  the  other.  Unit  level  
variables   related   to   threat   or   allies   may   also   be   biased   by   the   exclusion   of   relevant  
spatial   lags.  Accordingly,  models   4-­‐‑6   include   all   three   spatial   lags.   Each  model   has   a  
different  spatial  lag  in  the  disturbance.  Table  2  presents  the  results  of  models  4-­‐‑6.    
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Table  4.1  
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Table  4.2  
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The  results  in  models  4-­‐‑6  differ  from  models  1-­‐‑3  in  several  important  ways.  In  all  
three  models,  hypothesis  4  is  supported.  States  do  spend  more  in  response  to  increases  
in   their  allies’   likelihood  of  conflict.   In  all   three  models,  alliances  create  a  substitution  
effect   between   a   state   and   its   allies   –   hypothesis   3   is   supported.   Hypothesis   1   is  
supported  in  all  3  models  as  well,  including  model  4,  where  the  spatial  error  W  matrix  
is  likelihood  of  conflict.  Hypothesis  2,  however,  is  not  supported  in  any  of  the  models.  
Models  4-­‐‑6  do  not  provide  statistically  significant  evidence  that  strategic  rivals  engage  
in  competitive  spending,  when  the  likelihood  of  conflict  is  included  in  the  model.  That  




I  find  strong  evidence  that  military  spending  in  one  state  affects  others,  and  that  it  
occurs   through   multiple   pathways.   This   is,   firstly,   an   addition   to   the   literature   that  
evaluates  whether  and  when  arms  races  occur.  Countries  engage  in  competitive  arming  
when  they  believe  war  is  likely.  By  separating  two  aspects  of  the  security  dilemma,  the  
likeliness  of  conflict,  and  the  perception  of  the  importance  of  relative  material  strength,  
I   reveal   more   about   who   engages   in   competitive   arming,   and   why.   There   is   strong  
evidence   that   the   probability   of   conflict   creates   interdependence   between   military  
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budgets.   Evidence   supporting   strategic   rivalry   and   interdependence   is  much  weaker.  
This  suggests  that  competitive  arming  is  likely  to  occur  where  conflict  is  likely,  but  not  
necessarily   so   where   strategic   rivalry   exists.   Policy   makers   looking   to   decrease   the  
militarization  of  pairs  of  states  should,  then,  focus  on  decreasing  the  likelihood  of  war,  
rather   than  diminishing  the  acrimony  between  states   (except   insofar  as   the   latter  does  
the  former).      
I   also   contribute   to   the   literature   on   the   causes   of  military   spending,  which   has  
recently  focused  on  the  role  of  state  characteristics,  particularly  regime  type  (Goldsmith  
2003,   Fordham  and  Walker   2005,  Conrad   et.   al.   2013)  with   some  work   examining   the  
international  causes  of  arming.  In  particular,  I  build  on  the  findings  of  Nordhaus  et.  al.  
(2012)   and   Goldsmith   (2007),   by   distinguishing   between   types   of   threats,   and   by  
modeling   interdependence   directly.   Increases   in   the   likelihood   of   conflict   lead   to  
increased  military  spending,  as  Nordhaus  et.  al.   find,  but  not  only   in   the  manner   that  
they  describe.  Rather,  increases  in  the  likelihood  of  conflict  increase  the  dependence  of  a  
state’s  military   spending   on   its   likely   opponent’s  military   spending.   The   relationship  
between   likelihood   of   conflict   is   spatial,   as  well   as   linear.   The   evidence   in   favor   of   a  
similar   relationship  between   rivals,   however,   is   limited.  The   implication   is,   then,   that  
security  dilemmas  lead  to  competitive  arming,  but  only  when  the  security  risk   is  real,  
and   not   simply   perceived.   The   perception   of   competition   is   not,   in   and   of   itself,  
sufficient   to   lead   to   interdependence.   This   contrasts  with   findings   by   Rider,   Findley,  
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and  Diehl  (2011),  who  find  a  relationship  between  rivalries  and  arms  races.  It  does  not  
necessarily  contradict  their  findings,  as  they  note  that  this  relationship  only  exists  in  the  
later  stages  of  rivalry.  My  findings  on  the  effect  of   the   likelihood  of  conflict  provide  a  
possible  explanation  for  that  conditionality.    If  the  likelihood  of  conflict  increases  in  the  
later  stages  of  rivalry,  but  only  then,  controlling  for  the  likelihood  of  conflict  may  make  
rivalry   appear   causally   unimportant.   Further   untangling   the   role   of   rivalry   on,   and  
beyond,  the  likelihood  of  conflict  is  an  avenue  for  future  work.    
My  findings  contribute  to  the  alliance  literature  by  demonstrating  the  substitution  
effect  theorized  by  Morrow  and  others  (Morrow  1993).  This  is  in  contrast  to  recent  work  
on   interdependence   in   military   spending   through   allies,   which   finds   the   opposite  
(Flores   2011).   I   also   show   that   alliances   have   multiple   effects   on   military   spending.  
Specifically,  money  spent  by  an  ally  decreases  military  spending,  but  increased  threat  to  
an   ally   increases  military   spending.   Allies   also   experience   strong   interdependence   in  
their  disturbances:  exogenous  shocks   in  ally   j  are   likely   to  have  a  significant  effect  on  
military   spending   in   ally   i.   When   forming   an   alliance,   a   state   acquires   a   partner   in  
security,  which  can  lead  to  efficiencies  in  military  spending,  but  the  state  also  acquires  
some  of  the  security  concerns  of  their  ally.  Both  affect  the  military  spending  of  states.  It  
may   be   that   different   types   of   alliances   affect   military   spending   in   different   ways.  
Understanding   those   differences   could   help   us   understand   more   about   alliance  
dynamics,  and  is  another  worthy  avenue  of  future  work.  
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That  military  spending  has   foreign  origins   is  not  surprising.   I   show  that  military  
budgets  affect  each  other  spatially   through  two  particular  pathways,   the   likelihood  of  
conflict   and  military   alliances.   These   findings   have   important   implications   for   grand  
theories   of   international   security.   Threats   associated   with   the   likelihood   of   conflict  
matter.  It  is  not  clear  that  other  types  of  foreign  threats  do,  including  rivalry,  outside  of  
their   impact   on   the   risk   of   war.   Alliances   can   create   efficiencies   in   the   provision   of  
security,   but   they   also   increase   the   exposure   of   member   states   to   the   conflict   risk  
endured   by   other   members.   Perhaps   most   importantly,   examining   these   processes  
separately,   as   Table   1   does,   yields   different   substantive   results   than   does   examining  
them   together.   International   relations   are   dynamic   spatial   processes   across   multiple  
pathways   of   connection,   and   modeling   them   otherwise   can   lead   to   incorrect   or  
misleading  conclusions.      
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Chapter  5:  Conclusion  
  
The   three   papers   in   this   dissertation   contribute   to   the   literatures   on   military  
spending   and   arms   races,   alliances,   enduring   rivalries,   and   political   institutions   and  
foreign  policy.  Arming  is  one  of   the  fundamental  characteristics  of  states.  Variation  in  
military   spending,   despite   extensive   examination   over   several   decades,   was   not  
explained  well  by  the  existing  literature.  Different  types  of  states  respond  differently  to  
their   surroundings,   as   illustrated   by   paper   1.   Different   types   of   states   face   different  
domestic  incentives  to  use  military  spending  to  buy  support,  as  shown  in  paper  2.  And  
states  respond  to  some  types  of  threats  and  not  others,  as  found  in  paper  3.  Alliances,  
another  fundamental  subject  of  the  field  of  international  security,  are  closely  related  to  
arming.  They  allow  states  to  substitute  ally  spending  for  their  own,  but  expose  states  to  
threats  against  their  allies.  In  all  three  papers,  political  institutions,  in  a  variety  of  forms,  
play  a  crucial  role  in  explaining  variation  in  military  spending.  The  institutions  of  and  
around  the  state  shape  how  much  the  state  invests  in  its  military.    
These   contributions   come   with   a   number   of   important   caveats.   The   theoretical  
arguments  are  specific  to  military  spending  and  particular  independent  variables.  I  do  
not   conduct   any   analysis   here   on   alternative  measures   of   arming.   It  may   be   that   the  
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insights   above   only   apply   to   military   spending   itself,   and   not   to   arming   or   foreign  
policy  in  a  broader  sense.    
The  empirical  analysis  requires  several  caveats.  In  every  analysis,  other  than  paper  
1’s   examination  of   conflict  outcomes,   the  data   is   limited   to   the   second  half  of   the  20th  
century26.   It   is   possible   that   the   processes   described   in   this   dissertation   function  
differently  outside  of  that  time  period.  The  data  also  suffers  from  possible  measurement  
error.   Military   spending   numbers   are   frequently   estimates,   combining   the   released  
numbers   from   the   states   themselves  with   the   opinions   of   experts.   Governments  may  
have   an   incentive   to   provide   incorrect   numbers   (too   high   or   too   low),   and   outside  
experts  make  their  judgments  on  limited  information.  My  military  spending  data  comes  
directly   from  Nordhaus  et.   al.   2012,  who  use  a   combination  of  Correlates  of  War  and  
SIPRI   data   to   construct   their   dataset.   I   am   relying   on   their   work   to   minimize   the  
measurement   error   in   the  data.   Similarly,   in   some  models,   particularly   the  models   in  
Paper  1,   I   rely  on  measures  of   threat   that  may  be  endogenous   to  military   spending.   I  
again  rely  on  Nordhuas  et.  al.  (2012)  for  one  such  measure.  They  claim  their  measure  of  
ex   ante   probability   of   conflict   is   not   endogenous   to   military   spending.   In   Paper   3,   I  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  This  is  due  to  some  limitations  of  data  availability,  as  GDP  and  military  spending  data  prior  to  that  
time  period  is  increasingly  guesswork.  
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instrument  for  my  own  measure  of  the  likelihood  of  war  in  some  models.  In  all  cases,  I  
have   avoiding   using   measures   constructed   with   military   spending,   but   cannot   get  
around   the   risk   that,   in   international   relations   at   least,   everything   is   related   to  
everything  else.    
Some  of  the  weaknesses  described  above  can  be,  or  have  been,  addressed  through  
further  modeling.  I  use  both  the  natural  log  of  military  spending  and  military  spending  
as   a   percentage   of   GDP,   and   have   estimated   most   models   using   just   data   from   the  
Correlates   of  War.   I   use   instruments  where  possible   to   address  possible   endogeniety.  
Some   of   the   caveats   point   to   directions   for   future   work.   For   example,   paper   3   has  
numerous  potential  follow-­‐‑ups.  One  possible  approach  would  be  to  model  the  linkages  
between   states   as   co-­‐‑evolutionary   with   the   state   level   variables   themselves.   That  
approach  will   require  other  assumptions,  but  directly  addresses   some  concerns  about  
connections  between   states   that   are   endogenous   to  military   spending.  Other   concerns  
can  be  partially  dealt  with  by   looking  at  small  and  medium  N  data.  A  close   look  at  a  
small   number   of   countries,   particularly   if   they   are   clustered,   may   help   alleviate  
concerns  about  data  measurement.  More  nuanced  data,  such  as  arms  imports,  could  be  
used  in  smaller  N  analysis  as  a  complement  to  aggregate  military  spending  data.    
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The   findings   in   this   dissertation   suggest   a   number   of   important   future  
investigations.   An   examination   of   conditional   interdependence   between   military  
spending,  one   that  combines   the   insights   from  papers  1  and  3,  would  help   illuminate  
how  states  react  differently   to  other  states.  That,   in   turn,  would  help  us  describe  how  
changes  in  one  state  affect  other  states.  It  may  be  that  the  characteristics  of  leaders  play  
an  important  role  in  military  spending  decisions.  Their  inclusion,  and  their  interaction  
with   institutions,  may   shed   further   light   on  when   and  how   institutions   shape  policy,  
and   introduces   an   additional   level   of   analysis   (the   individual   leader).   Finally,   the  
arguments  in  this  dissertation  may  apply  to  phenomena  beyond  military  spending.  For  
example,  democracies  may  adjust  a  variety  of  policies  more   in  response  to  changes   in  
their   threat   environment.   The   findings   in   this   dissertation,   both   in   their   individual  
contributions   and   taken   as   a   whole,   point   the   way   to   future   work   on   political  
institutions  and  military  spending,  both  jointly  and  separately.    
  
  
  
  
